

**MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION  
COHERENCE BETWEEN TWO POLICY AREAS**

No. 43, June 2005

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**Annexe I** Request for advice

**Annexe II** List of abbreviations

## Foreword

On 3 November 2003, the Minister for Development Cooperation asked the Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) to produce an advisory report on asylum and migration in relation to development cooperation.<sup>1</sup> On 17 November 2003, the minister subsequently undertook to draw up a memorandum on development and migration, which she would present to parliament together with the Minister for Immigration and Integration. Many of the issues addressed in the memorandum were the same as in the AIV advisory report. It was also clear from the outset that the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Justice would need to deploy considerable manpower and expertise to gather the necessary facts and formulate policy. This made it difficult for the AIV to draft a report which would not overlap with the content of the memorandum. After consulting the ministry, the AIV decided instead to send Minister Van Ardenne an advisory letter containing one or two provisional conclusions. This was done in June 2004. The AIV chose a number of topics to examine, based partly on the aforementioned memorandum, *Development and migration*<sup>2</sup>, which had by then been published. Since the memorandum was so exhaustive, and either answered or addressed most of the questions which would have been posed by the advisory report, the AIV decided to be selective. It did not try to address all the topics currently under debate but concentrated on policy coherence, conflict policy, labour migration and the role of migrants in development. In doing so, it confined its recommendations to long-term policy.

Despite the care with which both the advisory report and the memorandum were drawn up, the AIV nevertheless feels that efforts to increase coherence between development cooperation policy and migration policy are based on the assumption that migration is primarily a problem which other policy sectors, such as development cooperation, could help to mitigate. The AIV advisory report therefore explores the opportunities for, and limitations governing, this pursuit of coherence.

The desire for coherence between development cooperation policy and migration policy is therefore the guiding principle of this report. The report divides the underlying causes of migration into four categories and explains how the Netherlands has tackled them in recent decades (chapter I). This is followed by a summary of the two policy areas and the geographical overlaps between 'partner countries' (i.e. countries with which the Netherlands has a bilateral development cooperation relationship) and migrants' countries of origin. It also suggests which groups of migrants would benefit most from policy coherence, based on immigration figures for the Netherlands (chapter II). The opportunities for pursuing a coherent policy based on the goals of Dutch migration policy, and the constraints on such a policy, are then examined for each of the four causes of migration (chapter III). The final two chapters consider to what extent development cooperation can help to bring about a coherent policy. They discuss how labour migration and

1 The request for advice is reproduced in annexe I.

2 The Hague, 9 July 2004, Parliamentary Papers 29 693, no. 1; this is subsequently referred to as 'the government memorandum'.

the role of migrants has affected the growth of developing countries. The report's findings are summarised in chapter VI. Each chapter ends with a list of specific recommendations.

The issue of migration and development cooperation touches on many policy areas and hence on a number of previous AIV advisory reports. These points of overlap are indicated in the text. The report discusses Dutch migration policy in the context of international cooperation, international rules and regulations and international relations. It also looks more specifically at the various dimensions of development cooperation, human rights, peace and security and European integration.

This advisory report was compiled by the joint Migration and Development Cooperation Committee, which consisted of members of various AIV permanent committees. The committee was chaired by Professor A. de Ruijter (chairman of the AIV Development Cooperation Committee). The other committee members were Professor P.R. Baehr (Human Rights Committee), Professor B. de Gaay Fortman (Development Cooperation Committee), Dr B.M. Oomen (Human Rights Committee), Ms E.M.A. Schmitz (member AIV), Dr L. Schulpen (Development Cooperation Committee), A. van der Velden (Development Cooperation Committee) and General A.K. van der Vlis (ret.) (Peace and Security Committee), who acted as vice-chairman. Professor I. Wolffers (Development Cooperation Committee) was a member by correspondence. F.D. van Loon and Professor S. Baron van Wijnbergen (both members of the Development Cooperation Committee) acted as consultants.

The civil service liaison officers were: Ms L.M. Anten, M. Rentenaar, J. Charas and Ms L. van der Spek of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Executive Secretaries to the Committee were, successively, W. Veenstra, Ms A. Nederlof and P.J.A.M. Peters. They were assisted by trainees Ms M. Shaaban, Ms D. de Jong, R. Palstra, Ms M. van Weelden, Ms E.C. Hulskamp and Ms S. Narain.

The AIV adopted this advisory report on 3 June 2005.

# I Migration: causes and context

## I.1 Terms used and future outlook

Migration – the process by which people leave their country of origin to live elsewhere – is an age-old phenomenon. It is a constant factor in human history, though its nature, scale and motives may vary from time to time and from region to region. Nor is migration necessarily always a problem. In fact, for many people and countries it is often seen as part of a wider solution.

According to figures published by the United Nations, approximately 2.9% of the global population was living outside its country of origin in the year 2000.<sup>3</sup> This is not an unusually large proportion in historic terms. During the early twentieth century migration was relatively common, especially in the Western hemisphere. The migrant population has nevertheless grown since the 1960s. Whereas in 1965, 75 million people (2.3%) were living outside the country of their birth, by 2004 this had risen to 185 million (2.9 %).<sup>4</sup> There are also marked differences between continents, with non-CIS Europe in particular experiencing a sharp rise in migrants from 14 million in 1960 to 32.8 million in 2000.<sup>5</sup> Migration in Europe is thus increasingly seen as an ‘issue’, especially since unregulated migration to highly regulated societies is perceived as being disruptive.

This advisory report examines the existing relationship between migration and development cooperation and considers future policy options. It looks at the contribution that development cooperation has made to migration policy and at the contribution that migration and migration policy have made to development in migrants’ countries of origin. Both approaches require an understanding of the causes of migration. In line with the minister’s request for advice, the focus of the AIV report is limited to South-North migration. South-South migration, which is far more extensive and also deserves attention in view of its links with development cooperation, and North-North migration, which is numerically important for the Netherlands, were not considered.

The broad definition of migration covers many different categories of people – refugees, asylum-seekers, labour migrants – each of which are covered by different legal regimes. This report does not discuss these groups individually. Migration is examined purely in relation to its causes.

3 See World Economic and Social Survey 2004, International Migration, <[www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/index.html](http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/index.html)>.

4 R. Holzmann and R. Munz, *Challenges and opportunities of international migration for the EU, its member states, neighbouring countries and regions: a policy note*, Institute for Future Studies, 2nd Stockholm Workshop on Global Mobility Regimes, Stockholm 11-12 June 2004, table 5, p. 85; partly based on UN figures.

5 See World Economic and Social Survey 2004, International Migration, UN, table 2.

## **I.2 Causes of migration**

Researchers and policymakers are largely agreed about the motives underlying migration. At macro level, these are referred to as 'causes'. If we want to influence migration with policy, we must address these causes. The government memorandum begins by analysing the concept of 'cause'. It then goes on to list some of the causes of South-North migration.<sup>6</sup> The AIV generally agrees with this approach. Below it groups these causes into four broad categories, each reflecting the (perceived) differences between countries of origin and host countries.<sup>7</sup>

Relatively poor security outlook due to conflicts or natural disasters,<sup>8</sup> leading to crisis migration. Poor political prospects and threats to individual safety posed by local regimes, which can raise the level of persecution to that defined in the UN Convention on Refugees. Relatively poor economic and social opportunities caused by indigenous factors, leading to migration as a survival strategy or a search for a better life; family members are frequently persuaded to follow their relatives abroad by the prospect of better economic and social conditions. Relatively poor economic and social prospects caused by the influence of the global market.

In the AIV's view, these four causes can be grouped into two main categories. The first two are broadly part of the security dimension of migration, while the latter two can be classified under the economic dimension.

Studies show that other factors also play a role. These factors, which the AIV regards as supplementary, are also referred to in the government memorandum. They are: the availability of information and networks, the falling costs of travel, the migration policies of host countries and the presence (or absence) of a 'migration culture' in those countries. 'Migration culture' here refers not only to behaviour but also to perceptions. Part of the attraction of host countries is the way their culture is perceived in comparison to that of the country of origin. The AIV does not however regard these factors as a separate causal category, but rather as mediating variables which can either strengthen or weaken an individual's decision to migrate.

## **I.3 The security and economic dimensions of migration**

The first two causes of migration, grouped under the security dimension, are chiefly associated with forced migration, since it occurs in a context of insecurity and threat.

6 Government memorandum, House of Representatives of the States General, 2003-2004 session, 29 693, no. 1, p. 16.

7 This grouping into categories is purely theoretical and is intended solely to make it easier to formulate policy. In practice, the motives of migrants will often overlap. Moreover, developments within one category will frequently influence those in another. For example, conflicts may be due partly to economic factors.

8 Although natural disasters, which can lead to mass migration, are sometimes difficult to forecast it is nevertheless possible to take preventive measures as part of overall environmental policy. Governments can also pursue policies to limit the effects of disasters. The AIV does not however regard this as directly relevant to the present report.



However, the distinction between forced and voluntary migration is somewhat artificial, since in practice different motives can coincide, overlap or evolve over time.

According to figures published by the UN, the number of conflicts around the world is in decline. Even so, at the start of the 21st century there are still a small number of international conflicts and approximately 30 internal armed conflicts,<sup>9</sup> as well as serious tensions in other regions. According to a number of leading NGOs, the human rights situation in many countries is far below internationally accepted norms. Many of these human rights violations reach the level of active persecution. However, there are also other factors which force many people to leave their homes, such as drought and other natural and environmental disasters. In mid-2004, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was providing aid to an estimated 17 million refugees. Millions of people spend years in refugee camps without any prospect of either returning to their homes or being able to start a new life elsewhere.<sup>10</sup> In addition to refugees, there are also some 25 million internally displaced persons in the world, nearly six million of whom are receiving aid from the UNHCR.

The other two causes of migration, which are grouped under the economic dimension, involve an element of choice. In such cases, migration is a strategy. Migrants are motivated by the prospect of a higher income and the chance to build a better life. Perceived opportunities in the country of residence are a key motivating factor, as are obstacles to advancement in the country of origin. Such obstacles are either linked to the country itself (its climate, soil, culture and institutions) or to the global market and international relations. Globalisation both endangers traditional sources of income and brings new sources within reach. It leads to developments affecting population groups which have no control over them. This can lead to social exclusion or to a more general instability. On the other hand, globalisation can also promote mobility, since geographical and other barriers no longer restrict the global marketplace or the labour market. In fact, flexible migration is essential for effective globalisation.

#### **I.4 Migration to Western Europe: an outline summary<sup>11</sup>**

Economic and social factors have been a major driving force in the rise of migration to Western Europe, and hence to the Netherlands, since the 1950s. Since then, a growing number of migrants have left Europe's Mediterranean fringes and other continents in search of a more dignified life. Progressive industrialisation and a better standard of education for the indigenous workforce in Western Europe, coupled with a process of

9 See High-level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change, December 2004, UN doc. A/59/565, p. 13.

10 The UNHCR estimates that there are 6.2 million refugees in protracted situations. See UNHCR paper on protracted refugee situations, Geneva, 10 June 2004, doc. EC/54/SC/CRP.14.

11 This summary was compiled with the help of various sources, including A. Appadurai, *Disjuncture and difference in the global economy*, in Featherstone (ed.), *Global culture: nationalism, globalisation and modernity*, London, Sage, 1990, p. 295-310; J. Lucassen and R. Penninx, *Nieuwkomers, nakomelingen, Nederlanders*, Amsterdam, Het Spinhuis, 1994; S. Castles and M.J. Miller, *The age of migration*, London, Macmillan, 1993; A. de Ruijter, *De multiculturele arena*, Tilburg, KUB, 2000; and in particular N. Wilterdink, *Mondialisering, migratie en multiculturaliteit*, in K. Geuijen (ed.), *Multiculturalisme*, Utrecht, Lemma, 1998, p. 55-66.

decolonisation in migrants' countries of origin,<sup>12</sup> fuelled demand for an unskilled and relatively low-paid industrial workforce. These jobs have increasingly been filled by immigrants from poorer countries with a large pool of cheap labour created by rapid population growth and urbanisation. Labour migration to Western Europe between 1955 and 1975 was thus prompted by a widening income and employment gap between Western Europe and other parts of the world. European companies began recruiting temporary labour in specific countries, encouraged and assisted by their governments. They thus obtained a growing supply of cheap labour from regions that were geographically, economically and culturally increasingly remote from the heart of Europe.

From the mid-1970s onwards, the decline in industrial employment caused governments throughout Western Europe to call a halt to this organised recruitment of foreign labour. This decline was due to a combination of (a) growing international competition, (b) technological innovation resulting in the need for less manpower and (c) the globalisation of production in which labour-intensive activities were transferred to low-wage countries. One of the consequences of this was the need for fewer 'guest workers'. This created a paradoxical situation in which a growing proportion of immigrants already in Europe now began to settle down permanently in their host country, partly because a temporary return to their own countries could jeopardise their legal right to come back to Europe. Many guest workers therefore brought their (future) wives and families over to join them. Provisions for these newly established immigrant groups were extended and migrant groups were gradually transformed into minorities.

Immigration to Western Europe became less transparent during the 1980s. Not only did globalisation bring with it a new category of economic migrants (highly educated and well-paid employees of multinationals and research institutes), it also caused a growing number of people from many different countries to apply for asylum. The governments of Western Europe responded to the latter trend by tightening their admission criteria. This restrictive policy led to an unintentional – and undesirable – rise in the number of illegal immigrants.

Migration to Europe therefore now falls into two groups, reflecting the international balance of power and prosperity. This is especially pronounced in large cities, and not just among established migrants but also among would-be immigrants. Western European labour market policies are encouraging a selective approach to labour migration which facilitates the admission of knowledge migrants while controlling the influx of unskilled workers. While it is true that globalisation requires flexible migration, its effects are not evenly spread: those who are trying to escape insecurity and poverty on their own initiative find Western European immigration policies above all an obstacle.

The aforementioned trends can be seen as part of the globalisation process: the progressive assimilation of groups of people into global interdependency networks charac-

<sup>12</sup> This decolonisation process prompted the return to the Netherlands (for a variety of reasons) of tens of thousands of Moluccans and Dutch citizens from Indonesia, to be followed later by immigrants from Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles.

terised by the growth of mutual interconnectivity and more complex relationships.<sup>13</sup> Since the 1970s, there has been a sharp growth in, and emergence of, industrial hubs outside Western Europe and North America leading to heightened global competition, the accelerated growth of international trade and foreign investment by multinational companies, the progressive opening up of national economies and the deregulation of international monetary and capital transactions.<sup>14</sup> The fall of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe and the reforms in China tie in with these processes, which have been given a significant boost by the rapid growth of information and communication technology.

A key characteristic of globalisation is that in just a few decades it has precipitated a mass movement of people, goods, services and ideas. The world is thus becoming a 'global village',<sup>15</sup> whose inhabitants are increasingly interconnected as part of a series of global networks in which time and space are converging.<sup>16</sup> Greater mobility, the rise of tourism and labour migration have all brought 'the other' into much closer proximity. The transnational links between countries of origin and destination, which are part of this globalisation process, have also intensified in economic terms. Ethnic entrepreneurs in the West import goods from their countries of origin, making extensive use of the personal contacts they have established at home. Many migrants also send money to family members, a source of income on which the economies of some countries have become heavily reliant. For example, at the end of the 1990s, the total value of the capital and goods sent back to Suriname and of spending on return visits by Surinamese who had settled in the Netherlands came to NLG 95 million per annum; these transfers made a significant contribution to alleviating poverty in the country.<sup>17</sup>

In general, migration is also encouraged by other forms of mobility. For non-Western societies, such mobility undermines indigenous lifestyles and encourages the progressive infiltration of 'modern' models of behaviour which either emanate from or are associated with the West. These Western influences are exported by foreign companies, industrial consumer goods, tourism and the mass media. A positive perception of Western culture encourages emigration. However, since the late 1970s, governments in Western Europe – supported by a growing section of their populations – have been less happy to welcome the flood of immigrants and their families from poorer countries. The unrestricted admission of these groups would, it is argued, push up levels of unemployment, result in yet more applications for benefit and put further pressure on

13 From a wider perspective, this globalisation process can also be traced back to the establishment of trading and colonial links between Western Europe and other regions during the 15th and 16th centuries, and in the enlargement and intensification of these processes in subsequent centuries. This laid the foundations for the asymmetric relationships that led to post-war migration. See in particular I. Wallerstein, *The modern world system*, New York, Academic Press, 1974.

14 P. Dicken, *Global shift*, London, Paul Chapman Publishers, 1992.

15 M. McLuhan, *Understanding media*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1964, p. 93.

16 A. Giddens, *The consequences of modernity*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990.

17 D. Kruijt and M. Maks, *Een belaste relatie, 25 jaar OS Nederland-Suriname, 1975-2000*, Utrecht/Paramaribo 2004, table 4, with sources.

an already overstretched social security system (thereby undermining the welfare state). This led to decisions to conduct a more restrictive immigration policy.

Such a policy contrasts sharply with other forms of transnational mobility. Whereas international trade and capital flows, like international communications, have progressively liberalised and expanded since the 1970s, transnational migration – at least from poorer to richer countries – has become increasingly restricted. This has become a major source of tension. While international markets and new communications media have weakened exclusive territorial control by the state, national governments still retain a key function involving a high degree of territorial control, by regulating who is allowed to live in their territory.<sup>18</sup>

### **1.5 The position of the AIV in the debate on migration**

Governments in Western Europe stress the need to regulate (i.e. restrict) migration to alleviate or prevent social problems. However, many academics and organisations representing migrants' interests take a different view. Not only do they point to the economic and cultural benefits of migration for the international community, they also highlight the stark contrast between the ongoing liberalisation of trade and capital flows and the highly regulated movement of people.<sup>19</sup> They argue that this contrast is based on an illogical selectivity which goes against economic laws and realities.

The AIV does not approach the problem of migration from only one of these perspectives: instead, it recognises the need to look at the way in which they interact and overlap. States have a duty and a responsibility to regulate migration in view of the far-reaching impact it has on their populations. This mandate is based on sovereignty, but it is also limited by national and international legal norms. One of these limitations is its practical feasibility. Moreover, government policies are increasingly made at EU level<sup>20</sup> and coordinated internationally. The authority to regulate migration must therefore be seen in the context of the state's wider global responsibilities. These responsibilities are reflected in a range of international norms, from human rights conventions to a commitment to the Millennium Development Goals. The AIV therefore concludes that the authority to regulate migration is not autonomous but is complemented by a state's wider global responsibilities. In other words, governments must take steps to eradicate the economic and security threats that cause migration as well as regulating migration itself.

The aforementioned view of liberalisation processes also requires some qualification. The movement of goods and services, for example, is not fully liberalised. It is also important to recognise that trade, outsourcing and migration are inter-related: in other words, migration is not the only way of bringing work and workers together. Nor should it be forgotten that it is people themselves (workers and their families) who are

18 P. Hirst and G. Thompson, *Globalisation in question*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996: 171. See also the discussion in *Nederland als immigratiesamenleving*, WRR report no. 60, The Hague, 2001, p. 38 et seq.

19 D.S. Massey and J.E. Taylor, *International migration, prospects and policies in a global market*, Oxford, 2004, p. 378; K. Mahbubani, *Can Asians think?*, chapter 'The West and the rest', 1992.

20 Compare *Green paper on an EU approach to managing labour migration*, European Commission, 11 January 2005.

affected by these developments. This is a good reason for taking steps to prevent social dislocation and to avoid an imbalance between supply and demand. After all, migrants need extra provisions in the form of accommodation, health care and education. Nor is it easy to incorporate the principle of the free movement of persons into a welfare state which guarantees its citizens a high standard of living based on shared income and expenditure.<sup>21</sup> Finally, admission to a country is also determined by security considerations.

The AIV concludes that the development of transnational networks is an irreversible process which will continue to intensify. This ongoing diaspora will remain in contact with communities in countries of origin, partly through migration. This will affect migrants' capacity to integrate into their country of residence. If migration continues at its present high level, these multiple interconnections will alter the nature of integration for those born outside the Netherlands, and for their descendants. In Europe's traditional nation states, it is no longer a matter of integrating a small number of immigrants into existing social patterns (such as the Polish miners or Italian chimney sweeps who came to the Netherlands in the early twentieth century), but of a multicultural society whose members interact only to a restricted extent and have more affinity with social networks in their countries of origin. Migration policies can only have a limited effect on this trend, even if they are supported by other policy sectors.

21 In his article *De fictie van grenzeloze solidariteit* (NRC, 10 January 2004), P. Scheffer argues that the position of unemployed ethnic workers is worsened by the continuing immigration of unskilled labour from developing countries.

## II The relationship between two policy areas

'Migration and development cooperation' refers to the interaction between two separate policy areas. Both have their own goals which are not necessarily complementary. An integrated policy requires improved cohesion between the two areas. This means removing any inconsistencies and creating synergy wherever possible. Interaction with other policy areas such as economic and social affairs and employment is also important.

Following a brief description of the two policy areas, this chapter will discuss how they overlap, the inconsistencies between them and the framework in which they should be coordinated.

### II.1 Development cooperation and Dutch policy

The main purpose of the Netherlands' development cooperation policy is to show solidarity with the world's poorest groups. In addition, it is clear that a world free of extreme poverty will also provide more opportunities for promoting universal (and Dutch) interests in areas such as peace and security, the environment, prosperity and welfare. Development cooperation can thus also be applied out of enlightened self-interest.

The overall goal of development cooperation is of course development, and more specifically sustainable poverty reduction and improved prospects for disadvantaged groups. The criterion for development is no longer simply a matter of macroeconomic statistics; its main purpose now is to uphold the fundamental human rights of the poor.<sup>22</sup>

In 2000, the UN member states committed themselves to attaining the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as interim objectives by 2015. In the Netherlands, these goals have been converted into specific focus and measurement intervals for the forthcoming period.

This report interprets development cooperation policy in the widest possible way. Only by doing so is it possible to see how broad the range of policy tools is. In addition to providing aid, development cooperation also creates opportunities for development through economic policy (including agricultural policy, environmental policy and above all trade policy), policy on peace and security and other aspects of foreign policy. It is therefore less a matter of development cooperation than of international cooperation.

Current Dutch policy on development cooperation is the result of half a century of experience. The insights gained during this time have led to the formulation of certain basic policy principles. These are brought together in the policy memorandum *Mutual*

<sup>22</sup> See also AIV advisory report no. 29, *Pro-poor growth in the' bilateral partner countries in sub-Saharan Africa* and no. 30, *A human rights based approach to development cooperation*, which develop this strategy in more detail.

*interests, mutual responsibilities:*<sup>23</sup> a focus on specific themes and partner countries; recognising the importance of measurement, reporting and evaluation; cooperating with individuals, companies, institutions, organisations and governments; promoting good governance and a favourable business climate; pursuing a coordinated regional policy; integrating foreign policy instruments; applying a gender dimension; formulating a conflict management and prevention policy; measures to improve health; and justifying the choices made to international organisations.<sup>24</sup>

## **II.2 Migration and Dutch policy**

Migration policy in the widest sense is foreign as well as domestic policy. It covers migration from, to and via the Netherlands, as well as integration. The Netherlands uses its foreign policy to further its domestic migration policy goals. This includes providing aid, contributing to EU policy and helping direct the activities of multinational organisations such as the UNHCR, IOM, ILO, OECD and the World Bank. At the same time, international cooperation can itself relate to migration elsewhere as a global phenomenon, including South-South migration.

Dutch policy on migration to and via the Netherlands is based on the sovereignty of the state over its territory. The government has chosen to control migration to the Netherlands, prevent misuse of the immigration system and combat illegal immigration.<sup>25</sup> It generally justifies this stance by pointing to the limited absorption capacity of Dutch society. The government has always stressed that it is committed to pursuing a restrictive immigration policy and that the Netherlands is not a haven for immigrants. The Netherlands has in fact had an immigration surplus for many years. According to figures published by Statistics Netherlands (CBS), emigration from the Netherlands exceeded immigration in 2004. This means that migration is not currently adding to population growth in the Netherlands.<sup>26</sup>

The wider framework of the Netherlands' migration policy is defined by its international commitments. A large percentage of immigrants are covered by EU regulations on the free movement of persons (50% in 2004). The UN Convention on Refugees and the accompanying protocol, the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and other human rights conventions, form the basis for an admission policy aimed at protecting people. Human rights conventions also set standards governing the treatment of migrants. Economic migrants to the Netherlands are covered by a range of specific bilateral and multilateral agreements. Migration in the context of fam-

23 A general policy document on development cooperation by the Minister for Development Cooperation, Agnes van Ardenne, 3 October 2003, Parliamentary Papers 29 234.

24 Under the criteria governing Official Development Assistance (ODA), the available funds must be spent in a regulated way on specific development-related ends. In the past, Dutch governments have therefore made specific choices in favour of designated partner countries, themes, partner organisations and channels. In the present context, the choice of partner countries is especially relevant. This is discussed in section 3 of this chapter.

25 Government memorandum, 9 July 2004, Parliamentary Papers 29 693, no. 1, p. 5.

26 See table 2 in this chapter.

ily reunification or formation is also covered by various human rights conventions, including ILO conventions.

The European Union has been developing a common asylum and immigration policy, especially since the Treaty of Amsterdam took effect on 1 May 1999. This policy naturally addresses the external dimension in the form of return and reintegration agreements with third countries. As such, it touches on the EU's common foreign and security policy and development cooperation policy.

*UN Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and their Families*

In 1990, the UN incorporated a large number of provisions in the Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and their Families. The convention took effect in 2003. There are currently 29 states parties, all of them countries of origin, although one or two of them also have substantial migrant worker populations of their own. Host countries, such as the EU member states, have as yet expressed no interest in becoming states parties. The Dutch government has pointed out that some of the articles in the convention are at odds with the Benefit Entitlement (Residence Status) Act, such as the obligation in Article 27 to provide social services to illegal immigrants.<sup>27</sup> Notwithstanding the accuracy of this interpretation, the objections to the convention raised by the host countries are wide-ranging and long-standing.

The AIV observes that, because of the one-sided composition of the states parties, the convention cannot achieve its objective. Campaigns and calls in leading fora to persuade states to become states parties have so far met with little response. The AIV is therefore in favour of asking the Committee on Migrant Workers, which oversees the convention, to explore the scope for identifying and modifying those articles to which potential new states parties object. The AIV calls on the Dutch government to take steps to this effect.

The Netherlands admits few economic migrants other than those covered by the aforementioned treaties and conventions. Preference is generally given to those with useful skills. Only when migrants are admitted for work purposes are their skills and experience considered in the light of existing demand. Such a selection process is not applied in the other categories.

The Netherlands' migration policy now covers a whole range of situations, ranging from the provision of information to potential migrants to the establishment of sheltered accommodation in countries of origin for minors who have been refused residence permits. In addition to immigration, therefore, migration policy also covers reception, integration and return. There is also a separate policy for specific groups of migrants (such as children) and certain forms of immigration (such as human trafficking). However, this report only discusses the government's return policy, due to its relevance to development.

27 Reply by the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, Aart Jan de Geus, on 8 August 2003, no. 2020313980, to questions tabled in parliament by the MPs Jet Bussemaker and Bert Koenders.



## II.3 Overlapping of policy

### *The geography of development cooperation*

Government policy on development cooperation can be divided into various categories. There is a range of economic, technical and financial measures which are used to provide aid and create the right conditions for ongoing development, and which involve a range of different funding channels.<sup>28</sup> Then there are diplomatic and political strategies, which include influencing the policies of third countries and international organisations. A third category covers coordination between Dutch and EU policies.

Most Dutch bilateral aid is spent in the 36 partner countries.<sup>29</sup> The cooperation is generally restricted to a number of policy sectors. The Netherlands has also targeted three regions as focal points for international cooperation policy: the Balkans, the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region.<sup>30</sup> Efforts in these geographical areas focus mainly on resolving the problems associated with armed conflicts.

### *The nature and geography of migration to the Netherlands*

If migration to the Netherlands (measured over the years 2002, 2003 and 2004) is divided into types of migration, reasons for migration and country of birth, the following picture is obtained.<sup>31</sup> Tables 1 and 2 show that immigration has fallen and emigration has risen, resulting in an emigration surplus in 2004. The vast majority of immigrants were born in Europe (including the Netherlands) and other Western countries (see tables 2 and 3).

Applications from abroad for stays exceeding three months are made chiefly by people in countries from which a large number of migrants have already come to the Netherlands (tables 3 and 4).<sup>32</sup> Most are autonomous requests for residence in the context of family reunification or formation.

28 Policy Memorandum *Mutual interests, mutual responsibilities*, House of Representatives of the States General, 2003-2004 session, 29 234, no. 1, p. 34.

29 Afghanistan, Albania, Armenia, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Colombia, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Kenya, Macedonia, Mali, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Pakistan, the Palestinian Authority, Rwanda, Senegal, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Suriname, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, Yemen and Zambia. See the explanatory memorandum to the 2005 budget, annexe 3.

30 The Netherlands' contribution to the EU's partner countries is discussed in chapter III, section 3.

31 Figures supplied by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) and the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND). The IND figures for 2004 cover the period from January to August. The composition of the figures based on IND data is not the same year on year. The CBS figures were updated in February 2005. The IND figures were partly updated in the IND Immigration System Report for the period from September to December 2004 inclusive (also the 2004 annual report), published in March 2005.

32 IND, 2004 annual report, March 2005.

**Table 1: Requests for asylum and other residence applications.**

Year	Total immigration to the Netherlands <sup>33</sup>	Requests for asylum submitted in the Netherlands <sup>34</sup>	Asylum requests granted	% of asylum requests granted	Applns for temporary residence permits <sup>35</sup>	Temporary residence permits granted <sup>36</sup>	% of temporary residence permits granted
2002	121,250	18,667	8,820	7.3%	64,700	40,114	33.1%
2003	104,514	13,402	9,760	9.3%	65,000	39,000	37.3%
2004	89,660	9,780	10,170	10.8%	55,647	27,800	27.6%

**Table 2: Total migration to and from the Netherlands per year, by country of birth.<sup>37</sup>**

Year	Total immigration	Europe	America	Asia	Africa	Oceania
2002	121,250	59,500	18,023	21,013	21,410	1,304
2003	104,514	54,892	15,537	18,039	14,939	1,107
2004	89,660	55,087	11,416	13,075	9,127	950
Total emigration						
2002	96,918	67,008	10,702	9,684	8,463	1,061
2003	103,706	69,901	11,696	10,446	10,604	1,059
2004	112,362	76,452	12,120	10,791	11,938	1,061

**Table 3: Immigration to the Netherlands per country per year.<sup>38</sup>**

2002		2003		2004	
Country	Total	Country	Total	Country	Total
EU	41.250	EU	38.059	EU	44.804
1 Turkey	6.181	1 Turkey	6.703	1 Turkey	3.876
2 Netherlands Antilles & Aruba	5.992	2 Morocco	4.894	2 China	3.137
3 Morocco	5.192	3 Netherlands Antilles & Aruba	4.273	3 Morocco	2.884
4 Former Soviet Union	4.833	4 China	4.025	4 Netherlands Antilles & Aruba	2.866
5 China	3.948	5 Former Soviet Union	3.651	5 Former Soviet Union	2.775
6 Angola	3.514	6 Suriname	3.433	6 Suriname	2.339
7 Suriname	3.413	7 USA	2.785	7 USA	2.172
8 USA	3.181	8 Afghanistan	1.838	8 Indonesia	1.400
9 Afghanistan	2.824	9 Indonesia	1.755	9 Iraq	1.009
10 Indonesia	1.969	10 Former Yugoslavia	1.357	10 Former Yugoslavia	891
11 Former Yugoslavia	1.844	11 Iraq	1.311	11 Iran	590

33 Statistical Bulletin, Statistics Netherlands (CBS), no. 7, 17 February 2005.

34 Information about requests for asylum from <<http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb>>.35 A temporary residence permit is an immigration visa for certain nationals from outside the European Union who wish to remain in the Netherlands for more than three months. Figures relating to temporary residence permits were obtained from the IND. <[http://www.ind.nl/nl/inbedrijf/overdeind/cijfersenfeiten/2004/Cijfers2004\\_regulier\\_MVV.asp](http://www.ind.nl/nl/inbedrijf/overdeind/cijfersenfeiten/2004/Cijfers2004_regulier_MVV.asp)>36 IND, figures for 2004. <[http://www.ind.nl/nl/inbedrijf/overdeind/cijfersenfeiten/2004/Cijfers2004\\_regulier\\_MVV.asp](http://www.ind.nl/nl/inbedrijf/overdeind/cijfersenfeiten/2004/Cijfers2004_regulier_MVV.asp)>

37 Statistical Bulletin, Statistics Netherlands, no. 7, 17 February 2005.

38 *Ibid.*

**Table 4: Nature of successful applications for stays exceeding three months.**<sup>39</sup>

Year	Applns for temporary residence permits	Temporary residence permits granted	Family reunification and formation	Study	Work	Other	Failed applns/ permits withdrawn
2002	64.728	40.114	39%	15%	7%	4%	35%
2003	65.038	39.000	37%	14%	7%	4%	38%
2004	55.647	24.765	33%	10%	5%	4%	48%

The request for advice and the government memorandum appear to suggest that more coherence between development cooperation and migration policy, if approached from the standpoint of migration policy, could help to control immigration to the Netherlands and Europe. Yet it is not clear which category of migrants would be reached in this way. Certainly not immigrants from the EU, the US or other Western countries. This rules out more than half of all migrants, according to tables 2 and 3. The request for advice also excludes migration for the purpose of family reunification or formation, since this is governed by Dutch domestic policy. This therefore rules out another major group of immigrants (table 4). Immigration for study or work purposes is already governed by specific policy criteria, so there is little that development cooperation can do to further regulate this category of applicants. The only group left is asylum-seekers.

**Table 5: Requests for asylum in the Netherlands per country, nationality and year.**<sup>40</sup>

Year	Total	Afghanistan	Angola	Burundi	China	Guinea	Iraq	Iran	Serbia / Montenegro	Sierra Leone	Sudan	Somalia	Turkey	Other countries
<b>2002</b>														
<b>Absolute</b>	18.667	1.078	1.894	452	542	477	1.020	665	516	1.613		538	638	10.351
<b>%</b>		5,8%	10,1%	2,4%	2,9%	2,6%	5,5%	3,6%	2,8%	8,6%		2,9%	3,4%	55,5%
<b>2003</b>														
<b>Absolute</b>	13.402	487	371	402	301	198	3.465	555	396	312		442	414	7.016
<b>%</b>		3,6%	2,8%	3%	2,2%	1,5%	25,9%	4,1%	3%	2,3%		3,2%	4,8%	52,4%
<b>2004</b>														
<b>Absolute</b>	9.780	688	177	405	268	116	1.041	450	396	138	255	793	339	5.191
<b>%</b>		7,0%	1,8%	4,1%	2,7%	1,2%	10,6%	4,6%	4,0%	1,4%	2,6%	8,1%	3,5%	53,1%

Requests for asylum have fallen sharply in recent years (tables 1 and 5). In addition, they are heavily outnumbered by other types of residence application and immigration flows (tables 1 and 4). Figures from the past few years (tables 5 and 6)<sup>41</sup> show that most asylum-seekers come from countries where there is severe political unrest or internal conflict. Many inhabitants of the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq have fled

39 IND, figures for 2004

<[http://www.ind.nl/nl/inbedrijf/overdeind/cijfersenfeiten/2004/Cijfers2004\\_regulier\\_MVV.asp](http://www.ind.nl/nl/inbedrijf/overdeind/cijfersenfeiten/2004/Cijfers2004_regulier_MVV.asp)>.

40 Statistical Bulletin, Statistics Netherlands, no. 50, 16 December 2004 and no. 7, 17 February 2005.

41 Table 6 can be found at the end of the chapter.

repression, revolution, war and civil war in their own countries (or regions, in the case of the Asiatic countries). Applications for asylum from the major trouble spots of the 1990s (including Bosnia, Sierra Leone and Angola) have stabilised and declined in recent years.

A group that falls outside the tables is illegal immigrants. It would be useful to have some idea of the numbers of people staying in the Netherlands illegally, their backgrounds and reasons for coming to the country. However, there is by definition no reliable data available. The government memorandum puts the figure at between 112,000 and 163,000.<sup>42</sup> This will inevitably include several tens of thousands of immigrants from developing countries.

Any efforts to integrate development policy with policy on migration will therefore only affect a small proportion of the documented flow of migrants into the Netherlands. This will cover at most only a few thousand cases; that is, no more than 10% of the total number of immigrants per year. If illegal immigrants are included, this would increase the overall number by a few thousand.

If only the countries of origin are considered with which the Netherlands has a development relationship, the group becomes even smaller.<sup>43</sup> The only partner country from which asylum-seekers come to the Netherlands is Afghanistan, plus Suriname in terms of immigration as a whole. Limited development aid is also given to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Burundi and China. Some countries of origin are located in areas where the Netherlands is pursuing a specific regional policy to alleviate conflict situations: Serbia-Montenegro (the Balkans)<sup>44</sup>, Somalia (the Horn of Africa) and Burundi (the Great Lakes Region). Public funds are also channelled to another non-partner country, Iraq.

In addition there is a clear overlap between migration policy and the theme-based approach to development cooperation. For example, the Netherlands contributes to the work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). And since the publication of the government memorandum, the focus on the interface between the two policy areas has increased, including in the budget.

#### **II.4 Coherence and integrated policy**

'Coherence' sounds like an objective concept: there must be consistency and all efforts must point in the same direction. However, when it comes to deciding what exactly that direction is, it reveals itself to be a much more relative term. Each approach in fact requires its own coherence. The term 'coherent policy' will therefore

42 See the government memorandum, The Hague, 9 July 2004, Parliamentary Papers 29 693, no. 1, p. 13. The Minister for Immigration and Integration, Rita Verdonk, estimates that there are between 100,000 and 200,000 illegal immigrants in the Netherlands; interview of 24 April 2004 with the Associated Press. The minister's own *Policy Document on Return* estimates that there are some 100,000 people without legal residence permits in the Netherlands (Parliamentary Papers 29 344, no. 20, p. 5).

43 The same conclusion was reached in the *Policy Document on Return*, p. 26.

44 This does not however mean that Serbia-Montenegro is itself receiving substantial amounts of aid.

be applied here only to individual policy areas. When describing how these policy areas should be coordinated within policy as a whole, it may be better to use the term 'integrated policy'.

In the context of development cooperation, 'coherence' or 'a coherent development cooperation policy' means actively taking into account the possible effects of all types of policy measures on poverty in developing countries.<sup>45</sup> Pursuing a coherent policy therefore implies weighing up the specific implications for development cooperation of decisions in any area that could affect developing countries.

Coherence is also a key priority in migration policy. The coalition agreement of the first Balkenende government, for example, established a link between migration policy and certain aspects of development cooperation.<sup>46</sup> The Policy Document on Return, for example, states that 'return and repatriation is an integral part of Dutch foreign policy, in which the validity of repatriation is weighed against other Dutch interests.'<sup>47</sup> It is not clear however whether these 'other interests' include the effects on poverty in developing countries. Coherence in one area does not automatically extend to another.

Both objectives of coherence must be weighed against each other in each specific case. It is even better of course to reconcile the interests of all stakeholders, countries and individuals. Migration policy, and immigration policy in particular, must take into account the development perspective. And development policy must conversely take account of the migration dimension. The greatest sensitivities arise when development cooperation policy is used to influence the movement of people from, via and to the Netherlands.

Lack of coherence does not only occur between different policy areas; it can also occur within a single policy area. Migration policy, for example, should help to meet demand in economic sectors by facilitating the admission of knowledge migrants and making it easier for tourists to enter the country. But a restrictive migration policy, which also needs to control immigrant numbers and maintain security, means that these goals cannot always be achieved.

There can also be lack of coherence between national and EU policy, and between the policies of different EU member states or other countries. For this reason, policy is best pursued or at least coordinated at EU level. In its advisory letter From internal to external borders, the AIV cites three factors which argue for such an EU-wide approach: (1) the growing pressure of migration, (2) the current and future performance of the internal market for immigrants from third countries and (3) Europe's ability to successfully regulate migration to Europe and ease the global migration problem. These three factors make action at EU level both desirable and necessary, including for reasons of

45 Based on a description of the responsibilities of the coherence unit at the Directorate-General for International Cooperation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

46 'Countries refusing to cooperate with readmission policy will forfeit the right to development aid.' Parliamentary Papers 28 373, no. 5, p. 17.

47 Parliamentary Papers 29 344 of 21 November 2003, p. 22.

subsidiarity.<sup>48</sup> Regulating migration to the Netherlands without regulating migration to the EU itself is unworkable in the long term. Nor is there any point in individual member states trying to divert immigration flows towards neighbouring countries. Such efforts will have no net result at this level. In time, immigrants will in any case be able to move to another EU member state if they wish, under the principle of the free movement of persons.

## **II.5 Conflict of interests between policy areas**

Coherence is not a given, but a goal that is difficult to realise. One major stumbling block is that different parties approach the task from different perspectives, often based on perceived long or short-term interests, that are difficult to modify or ignore. The integration of the two policy areas also sometimes leads to unintentional, unexpected and undesirable effects. This 'policy dilemma' can be illustrated in various ways.

For example, restrictive migration policies can make life difficult for individuals (and countries) who use migration as a strategy to help boost development. Such policies obstruct the transfer of revenue to poor countries and regions, and the transfer of knowledge and skills. In addition, a broadly restrictive immigration policy – no matter how defensible from a certain viewpoint – can, if combined with an ineffectual global policy, help perpetuate the vast refugee camps whose inhabitants face futures without hope. This does nothing to promote the development of these people, their countries of origin or the wider region.

Conversely, if graduates and other highly skilled individuals are admitted to Western labour markets – partly with a view to enhancing development potential – this can lead to brain drain. That can effectively turn a potential benefit for the development of poor countries into a handicap. Seen in this light, the Netherlands' desire to hold on to foreign students as knowledge migrants is difficult to reconcile with its policy of encouraging them to contribute to the development of their own countries.<sup>49</sup>

If we approach the issue of coherence from the perspective of development rather than migration, similar problems arise. The aim of development cooperation is to increase levels of prosperity for large groups of people. Since a community must have reached a certain level of prosperity before its members can start to migrate in search of better

48 See AIV advisory letter *From internal to external borders*, March 2004. For the importance of an EU-wide approach, see also the recommendations by the Advisory Committee on Alien Affairs, *Terugkeer, de internationale aspecten*, The Hague, 2004.

49 Government standpoint on the admission of knowledge migrants to the Netherlands, Parliamentary Papers 29 200 VI, no. 164, 24 May 2005.

economic prospects,<sup>50</sup> poverty reduction helps to promote mobility. In that sense, development cooperation has brought the opportunity for migration closer for some people.

Even if a policy fails to bring about development, it can promote migration. The largely unsuccessful efforts of the Dutch and Surinamese governments to improve the economic and political prospects of the inhabitants of Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles encouraged the migration of tens of thousands of people to the Netherlands. In short, this is a highly ambiguous area in which there are unfortunately no simple or clear solutions. In the Netherlands, the ambiguous relationship between the two policy areas is more latent than actual. Very few immigrants come from countries that receive substantial aid from the Netherlands; and even where they do (Indonesia, Egypt and Pakistan) it is difficult to establish a causal relationship between aid and specific migration flows. These are extremely complex interrelationships in which many other factors also play a role. Such factors can completely negate the posited correlation between levels of prosperity and the willingness to migrate.

## **II.6 Possible ways to improve policy coherence**

Chapter III describes the tools used in development cooperation (and other policy areas) which could influence migration. Chapters IV and V reverse the picture by looking at how migration policy can be used to assist development cooperation. However, one or two general remarks must first be made.

It is important not to subordinate one policy area to the other; development policy must not simply serve the Netherlands' migration goals. The AIV emphasises once again that development cooperation instruments must primarily be used to attain development goals. Only then should common ground be sought with migration policy.

If controlling immigration is a policy goal, then it is important to define more precisely what forms of migration need to be regulated. The oppressive phenomenon of enforced large-scale migration has already been discussed. The causes of such phenomena must be addressed, in the first instance to protect those to whom they pose a serious threat, the migrants themselves.

The political reality in the Netherlands is that it is – and will continue to be – easier to make government funds available to improve the lives of people in developing countries if these improvements are also seen to have positive effects in the Netherlands. To some extent, it is therefore a matter of visibility. It may be necessary to show more effectively that promoting stability and combating poverty – partly through development cooperation – can also serve the Netherlands' interests, both now and in the longer term.

50 The 'migration hump' theory suggests that a further increase in prosperity will put an end to migration, and that emigrants will subsequently return to their countries of origin. This theory gains more precision when it is applied to specific categories of workers (knowledge workers and unskilled workers). The sources of this theory are listed in the government memorandum: R.E.B. Lucas, *International migration to the high-income countries*, Boston University, 2004, p. 3 *et seq.* The notion of declining emigration and migrant return is rejected by those who argue that prosperity growth and declining transport costs will keep migration levels high. P. Stalker, in *De feiten over internationale migratie* (Rotterdam, 2003, p. 130), maintains that migration levels will continue to rise as globalisation encourages millions of young people to go abroad in search of a better life.

**Table 6:** Annexe to chapter II, based on K. Geuijen, *De asielcontroverse: argumenteren over mensenrechten en nationale belangen* (The asylum controversy: arguments on human rights and national interest) (dissertation), Tilburg, 2004.

**Requests for asylum<sup>1</sup> and quota refugees in the Netherlands 1980 - 2003**

Year	Requests for asylum	Quota refugees	Main countries of origin
1980	976	1.625	1 Turkey, 2 Ethiopia, 3 Chile, 4 Iran / Pakistan
1981	832	1.179	1 Ethiopia, 2 Pakistan, 3 Iraq, 4 Turkey
1982	840	513	1 Pakistan, 2 Turkey, 3 Iraq, 4 Ethiopia
1983	1.400	406	1 Suriname, 2 Turkey, 3 Pakistan, 4 Sri Lanka
1984	2.304	481	1 Sri Lanka, 2 Turkey, 3 Iran, 4 Suriname
1985	4.522	440	1 Sri Lanka, 2 Turkey, 3 Iran, 4 Suriname
1986	3.650	371	1 Turkey, 2 India, 3 Afghanistan, 4 Iran
1987	13.460	532	1 Ghana, 2 India, 3 Turkey, 4 Zaire
1988	7.486	782	1 Ghana, 2 Ethiopia, 3 Iran, 4 India
1989	13.989	596	1 Somalia, 2 Lebanon, 3 Poland, 4 Ethiopia
1990	21.208	734	1 Sri Lanka, 2 Romania, 3 Iran, Somalia
1991	21.615	589	1 Yugoslavia, 2 Sri Lanka, 3 Iran, 4 Somalia
1992	20.346	643	1 Yugoslavia, 2 Somalia, 3 Iran, 4 Sri Lanka
1993	35.399	659	1 Bosnia-H, 2 Iran, 3 Somalia, 4 Iraq
1994	52.576	493	1 Bosnia-H, 2 Iran, 3 Somalia, 4 Iraq
1995	29.258	605	1 Bosnia-H, 2 Somalia, 3 Iran, 4 Iraq
1996	22.857	615	1 Iraq, 2 Afghanistan, 3 Iran, 4 Sri Lanka
1997	34.443	261	1 Iraq, 2 Afghanistan, 3 Bosnia-H, 4 Yugoslavia
1998	45.217	190	1 Iraq, 2 Afghanistan, 3 Yugoslavia, 4 Bosnia-H
1999	39.299 <sup>2</sup>	348	1 Yugoslavia, 2 Afghanistan, 3 Iraq, 4 Somalia
2000	43.559	83	1 Afghanistan, 2 Yugoslavia, 3 Iraq, 4 Iran
2001 <sup>3</sup>	32.579	284	1 Angola, 2 Afghanistan, 3 Sierra Leone, 4 Iran
2002	18.667	159 <sup>4</sup>	1 Angola, 2 Sierra Leone, 3 Afghanistan, 4 Iraq
2003	13.402	164 <sup>51</sup>	1 Iraq, 2 Iran, 3 Afghanistan, 4 Turkey
2004 <sup>51</sup>	9.780	232 <sup>51</sup>	1 Iraq 2 Somalia 3 Afghanistan 4 Iran

1 Source: to 1997 inclusive: *Justitiële verkenningen*, Research and Documentation Centre (WODC) 9-98 24 December 1998 *Asielbeleid onder druk* (Asylum policy under pressure); Years 1998 et seq: CBS, Statistical Bulletin 27 12/7/2001; years 2001 to 2003: IND (INDIAC monthly reports).

2 Excluding the 4,000-plus Kosovars who were admitted to the Netherlands in 1999.

3 The First IND Immigration System Report (2002) published by the Ministry of Justice states that in the 1999-2001 period only 418 refugees were admitted to the Netherlands.

4 Source: IOM, Migration Info, volume 9 no. 1.

51 Added by the AIV based on figures supplied by the IND. Figures on quota for 2003 and 2004 added by the AIV on the basis of statistics of IOM, see < [http://www.iom-nederland.nl/cijfers/uit\\_vlucht.asp?item=grafiek](http://www.iom-nederland.nl/cijfers/uit_vlucht.asp?item=grafiek)>.



## III The use of policy instruments to control migration

### *The causes of migration as a framework for policy instruments*

Efforts to promote the integration of migration and development policy must start by looking at instruments which could support migration policy (i.e. control migration). Of course, it is not just development cooperation tools that can be used to influence migration, but all foreign policy instruments. Sections III.1 to III.4 identify the most effective of these instruments, based on the four types of causes of migration described in chapter I. These instruments are: an integrated security policy, human rights policy, economic and aid policy, and global policy. The chapter ends by discussing the institutional anchoring and standardisation of these instruments, and by drawing conclusions.

### **III.1 Integrated security policy**

Physical security is vital for development and for upholding human rights. An acute threat to physical security leads to crisis migration. Because the link between lack of physical security and migration is so direct, it offers some very clear starting points for policy. In addition to solidarity with the victims, self-interest is also a factor. This applies explicitly to countries which are a potential destination for migrants, but also affects the wider group of countries which feel the effects of migration in other ways. The ultimate aim is for the entire global community to work to promote security, and to do so in response to humanitarian need rather than a political agenda. The fact that this also ties in with the objectives of migration policy is an added bonus. Such a strategy does not necessarily require the Netherlands to become directly involved in all conflicts and disasters, but it does mean that we must make a contribution to coordinated action by the EU and the UN.

This report does not discuss in detail all the options for preventing, alleviating and resolving conflicts, or for promoting reconstruction and peacebuilding. There are analyses and recommendations on this in previous advisory reports, as well as extensive literature on the subject.<sup>52</sup> The AIV will instead concentrate on the political and economic dimensions; removing political obstacles is a necessary complement to purely economic strategies for poverty reduction. Growing political tensions must be identified and addressed. The international community can help in this, but it is ultimately up to local populations themselves to defuse such situations. Internal developments, and in particular government policy in the countries concerned, must therefore be critically monitored and influenced.

52 One recent analysis containing an inventory of policy instruments can be found in M. Kappeyne van de Coppello, *Intrastate conflicts and development policy orientations: a call for a concerted strategy*, in M. Muller and B. de Gaay Fortman, *From warfare to welfare, human security in a Southern African context*, Assen, 2004, p. 39-51.

An integrated approach to conflicts is thus seen as increasingly desirable.<sup>53</sup> It ensures that, in addressing armed conflicts, attention is always given to prevention, 'initial entry', stabilisation and reconstruction, and that all relevant political, military, civil and economic aspects are taken into account. The integrated approach is not just applied to the various phases and characteristics of the conflict, but also to the way in which the approach itself is organised. The initial phase – prevention – remains crucial. The primary aim of prevention is to avoid a dramatic deterioration in the security situation. The potential damage that an international or internal conflict or a failing state can do to a local population, a region or other more distant countries is enormous. Efforts to prevent damage costing billions is therefore at least as important as encouraging gradual progress in states that are already stable.<sup>54</sup>

Internal and external conflicts can lead to mass migration. Armed conflicts have led to the large-scale displacement of population groups in Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Great Lakes Region in Africa. The unrest in these countries and regions are reflected in the statistics on asylum-seekers coming to the Netherlands. However, by far the greatest percentage of refugees are accommodated in their own region. The security situations in these countries and regions are addressed to some degree by countries further away and in a variety of international fora. Costly interventions, which are frequently only made when a conflict is well advanced – and for which a high price is generally paid – often succeed in bringing about some measure of stability, as in Angola, the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone and Liberia. This is followed by a gradual decline in migration flows.<sup>55</sup> The willingness to send in troops or to encourage non-military initiatives is often not strong enough when a conflict is in the early stages, yet this is precisely when such interventions are more likely to succeed. Only when the fighting has escalated are world opinion and a desire to achieve tangible results converted into a willingness to take action.<sup>56</sup>

The AIV advisory report on crisis management called for integrated analysis and decision-making at national and international level.<sup>57</sup> Only then, it argued, could the underlying causes of conflicts, such as a poorly functioning economy, social injustice and exclusion, political repression and illegal arms dealing, be tackled. It added that institutions with responsibility for security and development cooperation should set shared

53 See for example the Explanatory Memorandum to the 2005 budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 32.

54 See AIV/CAVV, *Failing states: a global responsibility*, advisory report no. 35, The Hague, 2004, p. 40.

55 *Ibid*; the advisory report argues that while military intervention may be a logical final option, it should not be delayed too long if risks are to be minimised (see p. 68).

56 See M. Kappeyne van de Coppello, *Intrastate conflicts and development policy orientations: a call for a concerted strategy*, in M. Muller and B. de Gaay Fortman, *From warfare to welfare, human security in a Southern African context*, Assen, 2004, p. 43 and 45. The author describes how a projected study on ethnic tensions in Indonesia was not given the go-ahead until hostilities actually broke out in the country.

57 See AIV advisory report no. 34, *The Netherlands and crisis management: three issues of current interest*, The Hague, 2004.

priorities for countries and regions that pose a risk and formulate joint policies to improve the situation. NGOs should also be invited to provide input and advice.

The advisory report on crisis management argued that combined decision-making on policy measures was not yet sufficiently integrated.<sup>58</sup> It also pointed to other policy inadequacies. For example, the rules drawn up by donors on the spending of development aid are so strict that they deny policymakers the flexibility they need to implement an integrated security policy. Partly through the efforts of the Netherlands, activities in the security sector which are designed to create favourable conditions for development, such as stability, are gradually being brought under the definition of Official Development Assistance.<sup>59</sup> A more international political obstacle to tackling regions in conflict is the often limited commitment to resolving conflict situations. The international community should remain involved for long enough to oversee the transition from stabilisation to reconstruction,<sup>60</sup> possibly even for as much as a decade or more.

A structure with which people can identify offers the best chances of preventing unsafe situations or of addressing reconstruction following a conflict. Such a structure must embody democratic principles and tie in with traditional local contexts and values. The government must be transparent and public bodies should be predictable and non-discriminatory. Effective regional, equality and minorities policies should be in place. If international players such as the UN or the EU wish to ensure that such policies are realised, they will need to focus on three prerequisites: (1) knowledge and insight (2) the will and means to influence policy and (3) acceptance of outside influence by the government and society as a whole.

A sovereign state will not by definition welcome pressure from outside. Fortunately, using sovereignty as an argument for rejecting the need for domestic accountability has gradually become less acceptable. It usually leads to a dialogue within the UN or other fora. It is in the interests of the populations concerned for governments to be accountable for their policies, not just to their own citizens but also to other parties and structures within the region and beyond. The EU could further promote this approach by seeking support from countries that largely owe their continued existence to the UN and other international organisations and coalitions (Afghanistan, Bosnia, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Sierra Leone and East Timor).

58 This is not to suggest that the government is not aware of the need for more integration, as reflected in the recent memoranda on the overall direction of development cooperation, policy on Africa and reconstruction.

59 Further progress was again made in early March 2005 in the context of the OECD. See the letter of 21 April 2005 to the House of Representatives regarding the OECD/DAC meeting in Paris, annexe 2 (ODA factsheet on peace and security).

60 The term 'international community' does not necessarily refer to an organised group of countries with a common goal, but to all foreign entities whose public, political and military actions could influence the state in question.

Although the relationship between security and the urge to migrate is reflected in the development of migration flows, it is not of course visible in situations where migration does not occur because a conflict has been prevented. However, it is possible to look at situations where insecurity is followed by a restoration of security. This usually leads to the return of migrant populations. One recent example is the stabilisation of the situation in Afghanistan and the return of Afghan refugees from Pakistan and Iran. Statistics relating to asylum-seekers in the Netherlands show that stabilisation of a conflict or crisis situation is generally followed by a decline in the number of requests for asylum.

### *Conclusion*

Pursuing an integrated security policy, as the AIV has advocated in the past, generally also brings closer the Netherlands' migration policy goals. This is another reason for further developing this approach in development cooperation and other policies. Long-term commitment is vital, however.

## **III.2 Human rights policy and refugee policy**

Lack of physical security and political prospects causes people to migrate. An active policy geared to protecting human rights (in this case the right to personal integrity) and promoting good governance can be used to influence these factors. Radical improvements in a country's human rights situation, such as the removal of an oppressive regime, will persuade refugees and asylum-seekers to return home. Examples include Spain after the death of General Franco, post-independence Armenia and Eritrea, Chile following the removal of General Pinochet and Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban.<sup>61</sup>

Effective standards, enforcement, monitoring, an adequate welfare system, political commitment and public dialogue can all help to remove the structural causes of migration. Special attention should be given to tackling infringements of the human rights of women.<sup>62</sup> What is initially needed is a policy based on solidarity which seeks to set universal standards. There are frequent calls to put Dutch interests first in foreign policy. In this case, however, Dutch interests coincide with the need for international solidarity. Few countries (or populations) benefit from the uncontrolled migration of people in search of protection outside their own countries.

A specific comment which was made about Dutch human rights policy in the government memorandum requires closer scrutiny.<sup>63</sup> It refers to the inaccurate impression in some countries that the Netherlands is itself violating human rights. The AIV feels that this can be remedied by a more effective marketing of Dutch policy. However, it would be better to start by being open to such criticism and taking it seriously where relevant.

61 H. Olesen, *Migration, return and development: an institutional perspective*, in *International Migration* vol. 40 (5), IOM 2002, p. 137.

62 See also the 2004 UN World Survey on the Role of Women in Migration.

63 Government memorandum of 9 July 2004, Parliamentary Papers 29 693, no. 1, p. 32.

### *Protection in the region*

One category of migrants who should be given special attention are those who move on to third countries after spending some time living outside their country of origin. This is a clear example of parallel interests. If these migrants can be given shelter and protection in their own region – which would be far more cost-effective than it is in Europe – plus clear future prospects, it may discourage onward migration. However, this will only work if the security, economic conditions and situation in the region are improved for these groups. Substantial funding for local integration must be set aside to offer genuine prospects to the large numbers of people in refugee camps and to the surrounding populations. There must be a continuum leading from emergency aid via reconstruction to ongoing commitment. This would also satisfy the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, who has repeatedly called for such a strategy to be put in place.

The international community must obviously work with the country concerned to give people adequate, dignified accommodation and protection. The EU rightly emphasised the importance of this in the conclusions to the European Council of 28 October 2004. This would overcome the problem associated with ‘reception in the region’, which was discussed during the previous phase in the debate, namely whether the reception of asylum-seekers and processing their applications could be moved to camps just outside the EU borders, thereby replacing the need for admission to the EU itself.

We will now have to wait for the European Commission to implement the European Council’s conclusions in summer 2005. The AIV however wishes to highlight two potential dangers which it has already mentioned in its advisory letter *From internal to external borders*. First, reception in the region itself could result in people who need protection being returned to countries which cannot guarantee their security and treatment in line with internationally accepted norms. Second, such a strategy could further shift the asylum problem to countries that have already given protection to large numbers of refugees.

The AIV then feels that an effective human rights policy can yield results that tie in with the goals of migration policy. This can be an additional factor in formulating, implementing and presenting a human rights policy. Improving reception and protection in the region of people who have left their countries of origin also serves the aims of both policy areas. The AIV believes that the emphasis should lie on offering these people genuine prospects. A possible spin-off might then be that they decide not to move on to a third country.

### **III.3 Policy on economics and aid**

As mentioned, the aim of development cooperation policy is to foster development and sustainable poverty reduction in particular. The objective is to create better prospects for people and to protect their economic and social rights. Poor political or economic prospects can lead to uncontrolled migration. In that sense, all efforts to boost development will help to remove such causes. It is therefore tempting to take as a simple starting point that migration will decline as economic prospects improve.<sup>64</sup> However,

64 ‘To prevent massive migrations from the poor to the affluent societies, a significant burst of economic development would be needed around the globe.’ K. Mahbubani, *Can Asians think?*, chapter ‘The West and the rest’, 1992. Another theory, that migration is an instrument for bringing about poverty reduction, is discussed in chapters IV and V.

research suggests that the conclusion that more development leads to less migration is only partly true. This is because another trend is also at work, namely that development also encourages migration.<sup>65</sup> Increased national and international mobility in Western countries is also a sign of development. The conclusion that migration is part of the economy, and even a characteristic of development, therefore appears to be correct.<sup>66</sup> If we look at income per capita, yet another trend becomes visible, namely that large numbers of migrants come from groups who live just above the poverty line in middle-income countries.<sup>67</sup> Lower or higher-income developing countries tend to produce fewer migrants. Olesen refers to this as the 'migration band', a bandwidth that contains the largest number of migrants and is defined by per capita income or the relationship between income in the country of origin and realisable income in a country of residence.<sup>68</sup> Countries with more pronounced income disparities and a higher proportion of secondary education also produce more migrants.<sup>69</sup>

Development cooperation is cited as an instrument that reduces push factors (local conditions which prompt people to leave their countries of origin), especially in countries that tend to produce migrants. The question is, however, whether this allows us to draw any specific conclusions about the relationship between better economic prospects and the urge to migrate. The clearest examples are in the distant past. The exodus from famine-stricken Ireland at the beginning of the twentieth century was followed at the end of the same century by a large influx of immigrants, many of them Irish people returning to their home country. The migration of 'guest workers' from Mediterranean countries to northern Europe in the 1960s and 1970s was reversed – at least for Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece – when average incomes in these countries reached USD 4,000.<sup>70</sup> And when incomes rose above USD 7,000, emigration levels fell sharply. Presumably the critical threshold is now higher. This threshold is not necessarily the same as an income that is objectively defined as a subsistence income, but rather an anticipated and desired income level. According to a study by the World Bank, the number of migrants rises in line with per capita income until the latter reaches USD 1,630 (1995 prices). In diagrammatic terms, the link between income and migration level takes the form of an inverted U. However, this overall picture must

65 See the footnote on the 'migration hump' in chapter II, section 5.

66 D.S. Massey and J.E. Taylor, *International migration: prospects and policies in a global market*, Oxford, 2004, p. 384.

67 R.H. Adams Jr and J. Page, *International migration, 'remittances' and poverty in developing countries*, Policy Research Working Paper 3179, World Bank, Washington, 2003 (will be updated in 2005).

68 H. Olesen, *Migration, return and development: an institutional perspective*, in *International Migration* vol. 40 (5), IOM 2002, p. 141.

69 R.H. Adams Jr and J. Page, *International migration, 'remittances' and poverty in developing countries*, Policy Research Working Paper 3179, World Bank, Washington, 2003 (will be updated in 2005), p. 18.

70 In 1985 terms. P. Stalker, *De feiten over internationale migratie*, Rotterdam 2003, p. 128 and 129. This is based on an established correlation rather than on the reasons given by migrants themselves. It is therefore necessary to look at actual incomes as well, not just statistical units based on macroeconomic figures.

be differentiated in terms of income, profession and many other factors. For example, unskilled workers on lower average net incomes tend to migrate short distances.<sup>71</sup> Stability is also a crucial factor.

In the context of the bandwidth theory, therefore, the rise in per capita income appears to lead to a decline in migration only in the long term. The next question is how development cooperation can be used to improve people's economic prospects. When looking at the effects of capital transfer, it should be remembered that the income gap between developing countries and Western European countries is far wider than the gap that existed between countries like Spain and Portugal (both of which are often cited to prove the argument that narrowing income gaps lead to falling migration) and the rest of Western Europe in the 1970s. In the context of a long-term approach, one positive option would be to modernise a country or region's physical, organisational or legal infrastructure to improve its prospects on the global market. Hence countries that improve their creditworthiness – a yardstick for improved macroeconomic management – tend to have lower levels of migration.<sup>72</sup> Research has shown that long-term investment in social sectors such as education and health care ultimately makes a society more poverty-resistant, provided economic growth generates sufficient demand for labour.<sup>73</sup>

Is development policy a suitable instrument for a restrictive migration policy in the Netherlands? Migrants who come to the Netherlands usually do so under rules governing 'family-related migration', that is, family reunification and formation. These rules are applied regardless of the level of development in their country of origin. The disparity in economic and social prospects between the country of origin and the country of residence can however influence levels of family-related migration. Refugees are granted asylum because they have fled their countries due to a justified fear of persecution. Economic migrants are admitted under international conventions or because their presence will benefit the Netherlands. This leaves only the illegal immigrants and failed asylum-seekers, in so far as their reasons for emigrating are economic. Only a few of these individuals come from countries with which the Netherlands has a close bilateral development cooperation relationship, as shown above by the figures for the past three years.<sup>74</sup> So can development have any real effect?

The Minister for Development Cooperation is working to develop five specific themes based on the government memorandum. These themes are: a coherent policy, capacity building in developing countries, protection in the region, return and capital trans-

71 *Ibid.*

72 *Ibid.* footnote 69, p. 20.

73 See UNDP Human Development Report 2003, *Millennium Development Goals: a compact among nations to end poverty*, p. 76.

74 See the text and tables in chapter II, section 3.

fers.<sup>75</sup> The AIV is examining whether any specific choices within development cooperation policy as a whole could be used to support migration policy.

#### *Choice of countries*

The AIV believes that migration policy and the choice of countries should initially be coordinated at EU level. As is clear from the above, many of the countries from which asylum-seekers and other immigrants come are not development cooperation partners of the Netherlands. This problem could be resolved by adapting the list of partner countries to include more countries of origin of migrants and asylum-seekers. The AIV is, however, not in favour of this option since it does not tie in with the principle of solidarity with the world's poorest. Nor is it feasible, since it is highly doubtful that a concentration of funding on certain countries (e.g. China, Iraq, Somalia) would have the effect of controlling migration to the Netherlands (i.e. asylum migration and family-related migration), even in the long term. Dutch aid is in any case too limited to have a significant macroeconomic effect. If such a policy is to make any difference, it will need to have a far greater impact. This is best achieved at EU level. The EU can invest far more political and financial capital in its relationship with countries of origin and transit. It also has instruments, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy, which specifically target countries from which many migrants come (Turkey, Morocco, the CIS).<sup>76</sup> The EU uses joint analyses to decide how to apply these instruments. These decisions take into account national preferences and interests within the context of the EU's own priorities.

The AIV therefore feels that the Netherlands should not modify its choice of countries for development cooperation, but should work with countries of origin and transit to regulate migration within the EU's existing bilateral policy. The EU itself should similarly ensure that policy designed purely to limit migration does not compromise its own development cooperation spending.

#### *Development aid as a sanctions tool in return policy*

The government's policy on return gives concrete form to the issue of using development cooperation tools to support migration policy. The Policy Document on Return justifies the use of these tools by arguing the need for coherence. It states that the Netherlands' short and long-term interests must be carefully weighed against each other. On the strength of this argument, the government is planning to deny development aid, technical assistance and debt relief, perhaps temporarily, to countries which refuse to take back asylum-seekers or migrants. The AIV feels this poses a problem, given that the main aim of development cooperation is to help developing countries. Threatening to withhold assistance benefits them in no way at all. This caution is

<sup>75</sup> Report of the parliamentary committee meeting with members of government on the links between development and migration, 7 December 2004, report, Parliamentary Papers 29 693, no. 2, p. 7-8.

A sum of EUR 5 million has also been set aside to award contracts, grants and support to international organisations. See the repatriation and migration grant scheme, Government Gazette, 10 March 2005.

<sup>76</sup> The relative number of emigrants from each country (level of migration) also appears to be linked to the Netherlands' distance from the countries that receive the most migrants (the US, EU, Gulf States, South Africa). This suggests that EU policy should be targeted at neighbouring countries and at those which are likely to become neighbours following the accession of new member states.



shared by the Advisory Committee on Aliens Affairs.<sup>77</sup> In its response to the ACVZ advisory report, the government accepts this cautious view but refuses to rule out the possibility of a link between return and development.<sup>78</sup> The AIV recognises that there may always be interaction between specific aspects such as migration and development cooperation in any bilateral relationship, yet nevertheless feels that the spending of development aid should ultimately be decided on the basis of development criteria.

#### *Administrative capacity of countries of origin*

A more targeted deployment of ODA funding is now the preferred way of helping countries to bring about good governance and increase their capacity to regulate migration by improving and automating their population registers, training consular staff and so on. This also applies at EU level.

The AIV feels it is logical for the Netherlands to help its partner countries in particular to develop a migration policy of their own and contribute to the dialogue on migration. This will better equip them to deal with phenomena such as brain drain, remittances and human trafficking, not just in relation to South-North migration, but also as regards South-South migration. These countries should develop their own capacity to integrate their migration and development policies.

#### *Coherence with other policy areas*

It is also necessary to look at a wider range of instruments in addition to specific policy on development cooperation. If host countries feel it is important for countries of origin to offer their citizens good economic prospects, they should not simultaneously throw up barriers to imports from those countries (such as agricultural produce) or flood local markets in developing countries with products that undermine local employment. A controlled migration policy can only be coherent if it is matched by an effective development policy.

#### *Conclusion*

The AIV feels that in principle, the instruments used to promote sustainable poverty reduction are consistent with the goals of migration policy. In the short term, however, they will do little to help control migration. In any case, the scale of Dutch funding is not large enough to make any impact. What is more, this funding would need to be targeted specifically at a small group of migrants based on their need for asylum. The countries these people come from are those with a security problem. Most are not partner countries of the Netherlands, although they receive attention by its integrated security policy. Selecting partner countries based partly on coherence with migration policy is therefore best done at EU level, obviously while continuing to apply the ODA criteria.

<sup>77</sup> 'The recognised goal of development cooperation is structural poverty reduction. The ACVZ questions whether supporting the activities of individuals who are far from being among the poorest in society can make a genuine contribution to this goal, quite apart from the question of whether such support influences the personal motivation of the remigrant.' ACVZ advisory report *Terugkeer, de internationale aspecten* (Return: the international aspects), The Hague, 2004, p. 36.

<sup>78</sup> Return policy; government response to the advisory report *Terugkeer, de internationale aspecten* of the Advisory Committee on Aliens Affairs, 28 October 2004, Parliamentary Papers 29 344, no. 32.

### III.4 The world order

At macro level, migration is prompted by the existence (or perception) of opportunities in the host country and the lack of opportunities and/or personal safety in the country or region of origin. These countries or regions are often torn by economic and social upheavals which exclude entire population groups from new markets. This leads to a sharp decline in employment, especially in traditional agrarian professions.<sup>79</sup> All these factors are part of the economic dynamics of globalisation, which places great demands on economic players. Such dynamics are difficult to influence using national policy instruments, and crises will inevitably precipitate emigration.<sup>80</sup> So stability becomes a crucial factor for the success of migration policy, as well as being a general development aim.

Migrants are often described as the 'shock absorbers' of the global economy. In other words, if regional developments move forward intermittently, migrants can be hired and fired accordingly. This leads to considerable social friction.

The structural deficiency of a global approach is that it lacks a central institution to pursue policy and provide accountability. There is 'a system that might be called global governance without global government'.<sup>81</sup> The Director-General of the International Labour Organisation, Juan Somavia, argues that from the point of view of populations, the global economy is failing most significantly to create jobs in the places where people live.<sup>82</sup> This fuels migration.<sup>83</sup> Although there are countless examples of the relocation of economic activities to regions where labour is plentiful (and cheap), this is clearly still not satisfying the demand for jobs, especially in developing countries. This is almost certainly due to an inadequate economic climate, which presents yet another starting point for policy.

The AIV has already discussed the deployment of development cooperation instruments in its advisory report on the lessons that can be learned from the financial crises of 1997-98.<sup>84</sup> This report considered how development cooperation could be used both to help prevent crises (for example through institution building in the countries concerned, liberalisation processes and so on) and to address acute crises at national and international level.

79 P. Stalker, *De feiten over internationale migratie*, Rotterdam 2003, p. 42.

80 P. Stalker, *idem*. Page 130 cites the example of the peso crisis which widened the wage gap between Mexico and the US and led to a rise in emigration.

81 J. Stiglitz, *Globalisation and its discontents*, New York, 2002, p. 21.

82 ILO paper in preparation for the 2004 Labour Conference.

83 See *A fair globalisation: creating opportunities for all*, Report of the World Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalisation, Geneva, February 2004.

84 See AIV advisory report no. 14, *Key lessons from the financial crises of 1997 and 1998*, The Hague, 2000, recommendations.

The AIV believes that development cooperation can and must play a role chiefly in preventing financial crises through institution building, particularly in the financial sector, in emerging markets and other developing countries. This should be done by providing technical assistance and guaranteed investments. The AIV would prefer to see a concerted effort by all the EU member states to achieve this policy goal. Development funds are not intended – nor are they sufficient – to alleviate acute financial crises. The Netherlands should address this problem mainly through the IMF, and also through the World Bank. As a country that appoints administrators to both institutions, the Netherlands can influence their policy in line with the recommendations set out in the AIV report from 2000.

#### *Conclusion*

The AIV concludes that the best way of tackling the exclusion of population groups and the instability caused by globalisation is through a global response. Only then will it be possible to improve the structural position of certain groups and prevent the situation of others from worsening. This can only be achieved by pursuing an international economic and financial policy designed to avoid major shocks to the global economy. Such a policy must explicitly take into account the interests of developing countries. Technical assistance which encourages and enables countries to enter new markets is also needed.

### **III.5 Institutional anchoring and standardisation**

It is important to understand that regulating migration involves more than just identifying the causes of migration and using them as a starting point for policy. One key prerequisite is to anchor all these initiatives and partnerships. The EU has already been cited as an appropriate forum. Coordination at this level is vital to assure the free movement of people within the European Union and to improve coherence and effectiveness. At least as important is the need to work with countries of origin and transit. In the longer term, this form of cooperation and, more generally, the synthesis of migration and development policy, will increasingly need to be formulated at EU level.

#### *Standardisation*

Most of the existing standards cover the admission and treatment of migrants; they have little to do with managing migration. During the 1950s, 60s and 70s, when bilateral recruitment agreements between countries of origin and residence were still common, the absence of multilateral rules was less important. Now, in a progressively globalising world, more and more themes are being debated and agreed internationally. The need and desirability of a multilateral global approach to migration is therefore now being discussed. Such a move would be welcomed by organisations like the International Labour Office. National governments, however, are more cautious. The Global Commission on International Migration is due to publish a report later this year which will weigh up the pros and cons.

The AIV feels that following the environment, climate, biodiversity, the world's oceans, space and trade, it is now also time to apply global standards and rules to migration. Arguments in favour of doing so include the increase in migration (over considerable distances) and the extensive (including in financial terms) trafficking and trade in people, together with the human suffering it causes. Unregulated mass migration benefits no-one. Such global debates need not necessarily lead to the establishment of an international organisation or to increased regulation. In fact it is quite likely that more will be left to the market, although some supplementary social policy will then be

required. Since the causes of migration lie in insecurity and in a poorly functioning economy, it will be necessary to tie in with measures applied in those areas. The UN clearly has a part to play in this. Unfortunately, the focus on migration in the existing UN reforms and in the Millennium Development Goals is still limited. However, the high-level dialogue in the 2006 UN General Assembly, recently announced by the UN Secretary-General, provides an opportunity to make sure the theme is high on the UN agenda.<sup>85</sup>

### **III.6 Conclusions and recommendations**

- Migration is chiefly a by-product of poverty and insecurity. The Netherlands and other countries have a duty to help alleviate the plight of the populations concerned, out of a sense of global responsibility and solidarity.
- Measures to combat insecurity have been shown to have a demonstrable effect on mass migration.
- The best way to influence mass migration is to help prevent conflicts and disasters. Priority must be given to recognising and tackling growing political tensions, to enable the local population to defuse the situation themselves.
- Using resources to prevent a dramatic worsening of the situation in a third country is at least as important as efforts to promote gradual progress in stable states. Preventing a dramatic deterioration in a country (caused by conflict, environmental degradation or impoverishment), will simultaneously remove the need for mass migration.
- Effective international coordination must ultimately be used to promote security, based on humanitarian need. That this also ties in with the goals of migration policy is an added bonus.
- An integrated security policy must naturally also tie in with the interests of the Netherlands and the EU. These priorities must be coordinated with the largest possible number of countries.
- The tendency to focus increasing attention on the need for an integrated approach during crisis management operations, so that other elements of reconstruction are also addressed in addition to the security aspects, is vital for success. The Netherlands and other donors must continue to insist at the UN that the various independent agencies adopt a coordinated approach.
- Developing countries must be equipped to conduct crisis management operations in their own regions. They currently have little or no capacity to do so, and therefore need help to build professional armies under civilian control.
- The international community, including the EU, must make considerable funds available to offer positive economic prospects to people living in the large refugee camps, whether this means integration locally or eventual return to their home countries.
- The latest EU strategy to provide protection and shelter for refugees in their own region will be developed further in the summer of 2005. The aim is to guarantee protection for refugees and to ensure that the region is not burdened with extra costs.
- On the whole, the Netherlands' poverty reduction strategy is consistent with its migration goals, but this does not mean that tangible results will be visible in the near future.

<sup>85</sup> Report *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*, UN Doc. A/59/2005, 21 March 2005.

- Support for the creation of employment in developing countries and more particularly to encourage the right conditions for job creation must be vigorously pursued.
- Country and regional policy must increasingly be formulated at EU level.
- Cooperation with countries of origin and transit can be used to regulate migration and remigration, especially at EU level, through the European Neighbourhood Policy.
- The Netherlands does not therefore need to reformulate its choice of partner countries to tie in with its migration policy. Dutch aid is in any case too limited to make sufficient impact. Nor is it realistic for the Netherlands to adapt its development goals to accommodate the arrival of a few thousand immigrants.
- The AIV believes that the provision of development aid should not be made conditional on a country's willingness to take back its emigrants.
- Preference should be given to a targeted approach in which developing countries receive support in managing and benefiting from migration.
- A genuinely free trade system and free movement of investments (e.g. through outsourcing) can help mitigate migration caused by domestic poverty and international globalisation.

## **IV Labour migration in relation to development cooperation**

### **IV.1 Labour migration as a driver of, and an obstacle to, development**

In recent decades, policymakers have placed increasing emphasis on the need to give people in developing countries the opportunity to generate their own income. 'Trade not aid' has become something of a cliché. Dutch policy also calls for and works towards improving opportunities for products from developing countries. This entails opening up markets, improving quality and managing the chain from producer to consumer. However, trade alone is not enough.

It has already been pointed out that migration, trade and outsourcing are all ways of using the supply of labour in other countries. It has also been argued that under certain conditions, migration can help in the fight against poverty.<sup>86</sup> A more general conclusion is that an effective development policy should not only concentrate on promoting trade, but should also allow enough scope for outsourcing and the export of labour. It is after all a matter of using all available productive capacity to promote development. By deciding to migrate in search of better prospects, people are taking responsibility for their own personal development. They also often contribute indirectly to development in their country of origin, by sending back money or goods to their families. In some countries, these 'remittances' (which are discussed in chapter V) account for a significant proportion of national income. They can also include substantial investments. 55 million Chinese emigrants, for example, have sent home a total of USD 60 billion to their country of origin.<sup>87</sup> This raises the question of how policy on labour migration can be used to promote development.

First of all, it is not easy to relocate labour, either for the migrant himself or for the government in countries of origin and host countries. For migrants, the social costs of relocation take the form of disintegrating families and communities. Migrants are also vulnerable before and after they reach the host country (e.g. to human trafficking or racial discrimination). This can also be addressed by regulating migration.

Host countries should also take extra steps to provide migrants with accommodation, health care and education.<sup>88</sup> Obviously this can become very expensive over time. A study carried out in 2003 by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) found that economic migrants have cost the Netherlands more than they have

86 See R.H. Adams Jr and J. Page, *International migration, 'remittances' and poverty in developing countries*, Policy Research Working Paper 3179, World Bank, Washington, 2003 (to be updated in 2005).

The authors argue that while the relationship between migration and development is certainly not unambiguous, a study of 74 low and middle-income countries showed that a 10% rise in the number of emigrants coincided with a 1.6% reduction in the number of people living below the poverty line.

87 ILO paper: *Towards a fair deal for migrant workers in the global economy*, 2002, executive summary, p. 5.

88 See chapter II.

contributed in financial terms.<sup>89</sup> However, this was a very general study which cannot be used to make predictions for the future.<sup>90</sup> The results obtained were influenced partly by the low labour participation of the population groups who came to the Netherlands during the 1960s and 70s, and their relatively low levels of education.<sup>91</sup>

Developing countries find it equally difficult to encourage migration. It is a crude instrument which is not by definition designed to promote the factors required for success. Conditions aimed at boosting poverty reduction in the region of origin will need to be introduced into structures and policy. There must also be a specific demand for labour in the host country.

There are other problems associated with encouraging migration. Migration can ultimately change the character of a country if its people are constantly being told that they must go abroad if they want to improve their lives. The migration culture of the Caribbean is a case in point.<sup>92</sup> Warnings about the risk of brain drain are also not new.<sup>93</sup> Young, highly educated and active people are leaving their home countries. It is known, for example, that immigrants to the US and Europe are more highly educated than the average in their countries of origin. Many developing countries lose around 30% of their university graduates to jobs abroad.<sup>94</sup> Examples from the medical profession are familiar enough. Clearly, such an exodus is disastrous for a developing country. Under such circumstances, investments to improve the educational level of the population will achieve little. On the other hand, highly educated migrants are more likely to be able to provide the substantial remittances which can make such a major contribution to development. Circular, or rather, flexible, migration enables migrants in the diaspora to contribute to the economic growth of their countries of origin.

The AIV believes that brain drain should be tackled in a balanced and carefully considered way. After all, the emigration of highly skilled workers is not always a negative factor for a country of origin. It depends partly on the level of development of the country concerned, the professional group involved, the employment situation, how the individual's training was financed and whether or not he or she intends to return.

89 H.J. Roodenburg, R. Euwals, H.J.M. ter Rele, *Immigration and the Dutch economy*, CPB special publication, The Hague, 2003, p. 61. See also H.J.M. ter Rele, H.J. Roodenburg, *Immigratie en vergrijzing in het perspectief van de schatkist*, in DEMOS, vol. 19, Nov/Dec 2003.

90 See also the remarks by the ACVZ in the advisory report *Regulering en facilitering van arbeidsmigratie*, The Hague, 2004, p. 28.

91 Compare CPB 2003, p. 67.

92 P. Stalker, *De feiten over internationale migratie*, Rotterdam, 2003, p. 114 plus various books by V.S. Naipaul.

93 See AIV advisory report no. 39, *Services liberalisation and developing countries: does liberalisation produce deprivation?*, The Hague, 2004, p. 25-27. A point-by-point discussion can be found in the government memorandum and in the ACVZ advisory report *Regulering en facilitering van arbeidsmigratie*, The Hague, 2004.

94 H. Olesen, *Migration, return and development: an institutional perspective*, in *International Migration* vol. 40 (5), IOM 2002, p. 136.

If countries choose to use their education as a strong economic asset, this can be respected as a way of allowing their populations to share in development, as in the Philippines. However, for many countries the departure of highly qualified labour is a major loss. Controlled immigration by host countries is therefore advisable. For example, in 2001 the United Kingdom's National Health Service introduced a code of conduct to discourage the active recruitment of doctors and nurses from developing countries.<sup>95</sup> The fact that the Netherlands itself is making almost no contribution to the brain drain does not mean that it should not also try to tackle this global phenomenon, partly in the interests of development cooperation.

Steps must also be taken to convert brain drain into what has now been dubbed 'brain gain'. This must be done by creating the right conditions for a permanent or temporary return to the country of origin. The government memorandum also rightly opts for this approach. The AIV therefore recommends a study on return programmes (this is discussed in chapter V).

#### **IV.2 Relocating employment to the supply of labour**

The progressive worldwide integration of national economies – now an important source of poverty reduction and prosperity – is chiefly the result of increased global access to means of production such as capital and knowledge, and the removal of trade restrictions. Optimal international deployment of labour as a means of production is, however, more difficult to achieve. Trade brings products onto the market, and economic migrants move to where work is available. Relocating work to where labour is available, through outsourcing and/or offshoring, is a way of exploiting the low cost of labour. Together with trade, it is an efficient form of market-driven poverty reduction, whereas the migration of workers will generally make a smaller contribution as well as involving much higher transaction costs and problems of adjustment.

Although this process is centuries-old, its importance has grown rapidly in recent decades due to the sharp decline in the costs of communication, transport and travel. Removing obstacles to international trade in goods and rising labour costs in the richer countries have further stimulated this tendency towards what is now referred to as outsourcing and/or offshoring. Rapid developments in communication technology are another major reason why in recent years outsourcing has also grown rapidly for highly skilled but often labour-intensive employment such as automation and research and development. Increasing restrictions on migration are an added factor in encouraging employment to move to the source of labour.

For the countries to which these activities relocate, outsourcing brings many benefits and a small number of risks. The main benefit is that the activity itself will contribute to the economic development of the host country. Secondary effects are: (1) increasing necessary investment (construction, infrastructure, etc.), (2) external spin-offs (suppliers, logistical services, etc.), (3) the acquisition of knowledge and skills by workers and (4) the creation of incentives for potential workers to undergo training.

<sup>95</sup> Cited in the *UN Millennium Project: a practical plan to achieve the Millennium Development Goals* (Sachs report), full text, 2005, p. 103. Text can be found at: <http://www.dh.gov.uk/assetRoot/04/09/77/34/04097734.pdf>.



Companies in developing countries wishing to broaden their opportunities will need to make an increasingly innovative contribution to the production process and to spread their risks. If they actively create opportunities for themselves on the market they will be less vulnerable to the demands of their customers, who are always on the look-out for ways to cut costs. At the same time, governments and companies have a responsibility to ensure that they meet standards governing the quality of labour (health and safety, etc.), for example through the universal application of ILO norms and the OECD Guidelines for Multinationals (2000).

In this context, promoting the private sector in developing countries is a very useful aim of development policy. The benefits for the local economy can be significant. Moreover, the disadvantages for the Dutch economy in the form of job losses are limited, according to two recent studies.<sup>96</sup> The idea that relocating work always has negative effects for the country where the activity is discontinued is also not valid. On the other hand, it can require major adjustments at micro level.<sup>97</sup> In the United States, for example, the outsourcing of information technology has not led to job losses in the IT sector. Research has shown that outsourcing in fact helps companies to secure their future and develop new forms of labour and skills. The same view is taken by the Centre for the Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries (CBI), which uses development aid to bring together Dutch companies and their counterparts in developing countries to increase the latter's competitiveness on the European market, partly through outsourcing. This in turn strengthens the competitiveness of the Dutch companies by enabling them to cut their costs.<sup>98</sup>

The notion that these global processes can be influenced at national level is an illusion. Attempts by governments to limit outsourcing could however weaken the competitiveness of their own private sector. The Dutch trade union movement is therefore also against such a policy. While outsourcing could have a major impact on employment in the Netherlands if it occurs intermittently, discouraging or hampering it could have even greater repercussions in the long term. According to the aforementioned reports by and on behalf of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, these developments are being monitored. A balanced industry and services policy should prevent such shocks from occurring.

Restricting outsourcing/offshoring appears to be neither possible nor desirable.<sup>99</sup> The AIV therefore recommends that the government takes a targeted approach to this

96 Ministry of Economic Affairs, *Visie op verplaatsing*, The Hague, January 2005, partly based on research by bureau Berenschot: *Aard, omvang en effecten van verplaatsen van bedrijfsactiviteiten naar het buitenland*. CPB, report no. 76, *Verplaatsing vanuit Nederland; motieven, gevolgen en beleid*, February 2005.

97 The advisory report *Services liberalisation and developing countries: does liberalisation produce deprivation?*, (report no. 39, The Hague, 2004, p. 7) argues that to blame loss of employment on the transfer of service-based activities to low-wage countries is to fail to recognise the long-term benefits of liberalisation.

98 See [www.cbi.nl](http://www.cbi.nl).

99 The AIV notes that Minister Van Ardenne takes the same view in her reply of 9 May 2005 to its advisory report no. 39.

mechanism and uses it to enhance existing strengths and minimise risks. In practice, this means that rather than trying to oppose 'outsourcing', the government should help to formulate standards governing employment and other areas and encourage their enforcement worldwide.

### **IV.3 Applying a development perspective**

This report has already discussed labour migration and outsourcing in relation to development cooperation. Migration management should also be used as a more general instrument in achieving the Millennium Development Goals, by targeting poverty reduction, economic growth and private sector development. It can also help to promote gender equality and combat disease.<sup>100</sup>

The Netherlands should also consider the positive developmental effects of negotiations on cross-border employment and contracts under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Such moves should make it easier for service providers to temporarily reside in other countries.

The recent AIV advisory report on services already contains various recommendations:<sup>101</sup>

- The AIV recommends that the EU should investigate the opportunities for circular migration. In particular, it should consider the introduction of a special GATS visa or similar type of multiple entry visa (green card) for temporary economic migrants under mode 4. The length of such temporary visas will depend on demand in the host country. The AIV awaits with interest the progress update in the interim report on the government memorandum.
- The AIV also sees opportunities for twinnings/partnerships with institutes in developing countries through public-private partnerships, e.g. with research and care institutes. This will give institutions in developing countries the chance to establish linkages with individuals and institutions in developed countries with the relevant expertise and experience. The AIV recommends organising reciprocal visits in the form of exchanges and short courses and promoting conferences, for example by simplifying visa procedures and introducing special immigration provisions.<sup>102</sup>

100 As also advocated by the IOM. See *Migration and development: current policy challenges*, paper prepared by the Migration Policy and Research Department, IOM, Geneva, January 2004, p. 3.

101 See AIV advisory report no. 39, *Services liberalisation and developing countries: does liberalisation produce deprivation?*, The Hague, 2004, p. 31. See also the response of 9 May 2005 from Minister Van Ardenne on behalf of the government. The recommendations to which a response has already been given are included here, for the sake of completeness.

102 In her response of 9 May 2005, Minister Van Ardenne has already indicated that the government's options for doing this are limited.

*Can GATS mode 4 be applied to low-skilled workers?*<sup>103</sup>

Although in theory GATS opens the door to workers at all levels, developed countries in fact still give preference to highly qualified personnel through restrictions in their immigration policies. Far fewer opportunities for temporary residence are offered to low-skilled workers (where developing countries appear to have a comparative advantage), under GATS or any other scheme.

An added complication is that all OECD countries are bound by minimum requirements governing wages, social security and occupational health and safety. Recruiting temporary labour from abroad for a specific job in exchange for low wages and poor accommodation, such as agricultural and horticultural workers from Poland, is expressly not the purpose of GATS. These restrictions limit formal demand for low-skilled workers from developing countries.

The progressive ageing of the population in Europe is likely to heighten demand for care, domestic support and other forms of assistance, leading to shortages of suitable and employable personnel. This will not provisionally apply to the overall demand for low-skilled workers.<sup>104</sup> But in the long-term, a shortage will occur here too. The EU member states will therefore need to rethink their existing policy of excluding low-skilled workers from mode 4 migration, to meet future demand for care and to maintain the vitality of their own economies. A serious debate concerning this question is in everyone's interest.

The AIV recommends that the Centres for Work and Income (CWI) and employers' organisations evaluate the temporary or permanent demand for low-skilled workers from developing countries. This evaluation should take account of the long-term developments and challenges facing the economies of the Netherlands and the rest of Europe. The partial opening up of the labour market to low-skilled workers under GATS will then help in the development of recruitment packages which will be acceptable to both developed and developing countries. However, this does not mean that the government will itself be expected to undertake recruitment. This is the responsibility of the organisation employing the workers. The government is only responsible for keeping open the channels for mobility.

In the near future, it is worth considering whether it is possible to broaden the definition of 'specialist' (i.e. holders of secondary education qualifications) under the GATS mode 4 schemes to include the stratum between low-skilled and highly-skilled workers. This would help developing countries with a large supply of labour in the middle-management category, such as technical support staff, junior trainees and non-graduate IT specialists. Nurses also fall into this category.<sup>105</sup>

103 Based on the aforementioned AIV advisory report no. 39. 'Mode 4' (the temporary admission of natural persons) is one of the four forms of cross-border service provision identified under GATS. The service provider as a natural person relocates to another country to provide a temporary service (e.g. grape-pickers, computer experts, nurses).

104 Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market (ROA), quoted in VNO/NCW *Toekomstverkenning arbeidsmarkt*, 2001.

105 At the moment, only around 200 nurses from developing countries come to the Netherlands each year. By comparison, the United Kingdom, which conducts an active recruitment policy in these countries, admits roughly 10,000 nursing staff from developing countries.

The widening of market access for this group will benefit developing countries. The AIV also recommends redefining the existing categories of workers within GATS, since countries often fail to recognise each other's qualifications.<sup>106</sup>

#### **IV.4 Applying Dutch migration policy strategy**

The Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) and the CPB have conducted a survey on the Netherlands' long-term immigration needs. They concluded that over time, migration does not offer an adequate counterbalance to the pressure of a greying population. The only way to keep the ratio of retired to working people at, say, 1995 levels would be to admit several million immigrants, which would expand the Dutch population to many tens of millions by the year 2100.<sup>107</sup>

Migrants also appear to cost the Netherlands more than they generate in revenue. This has already been discussed – and qualified, given that these findings are based on the contribution made by existing migrants, who are generally low-skilled and experience high unemployment. Selection at the gate would produce an entirely different picture. Levels of unemployment would also fall as the share of the working population continues to decline.

An ACVZ study on labour migration reaches some extremely cautious conclusions: 'the government is only partially correct when it says that the Dutch population is still relatively young and there is consequently no demand for immigrants. [...] If we take a medium or long-term view, this ceases to be the case.'<sup>108</sup> The Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market (ROA) predicts that there will be substantial shortages of medium and highly-qualified personnel in a range of different scenarios in the years leading up to 2007.<sup>109</sup> This is, however, a macro approach which does not provide enough insight into the exact nature of the vacancies that will arise. The Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers (VNO-NCW) has already identified specific sectors where these shortages are now being felt.<sup>110</sup> A study launched recently by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment to assess these needs will also look at ways to facilitate the recruitment of migrants from developing countries.

106 Minister Van Ardenne endorses this in her response to the AIV report on services.

107 E. van Imhoff and N. van Nimwegen, *Migratie GEEN remedie tegen vergrijzing*, in: DEMOS, 2000, vol. 16, number. 2. This argument is also put forward by the Social and Economic Council (SER); SER report 02-02, *EU en vergrijzing*, The Hague 2002, p. 37. The Advisory Council on Government Policy (WRR) argues that a responsibly financed government policy does not require immigrants to resolve the country's financial problems. See also *Nederland als immigratiesamenleving*, WRR report no. 60, The Hague, 2001, p. 127.

108 See *Arbeidsimmigratie naar Nederland*, a literature-based study commissioned by the ACVZ, The Hague, December 2003, p. 191.

109 Cited in VNO/NCW, *Toekomstverkenning arbeidsmarkt*, 2001.

110 *Ibid.*

#### IV.5 Transnational perspectives

Developing countries with large diaspora communities living in a wide range of developed countries are in a good position to contribute to development, or at least to alleviate poverty, in their countries of origin. One such example is Somalia. A poor country without a centralised government, it nevertheless has a dynamic media and education system. Somali migrant communities, particularly in the US, have shown themselves prepared to send home substantial remittances. These have helped, for example, to fund the establishment of universities.<sup>111</sup>

Travel is vital if such contacts and exchanges are to be fully exploited. People can then alternate their time between the host country and the country of origin. This is sometimes referred to as 'circular migration', which suggests that there are only two countries involved and that the cycle will eventually end in the country of origin. It is better to speak of 'flexible migration' or 'flexible residence'. Dutch policy applies clear restrictions to such migration: as a rule, anyone who returns to their country of origin and changes their main place of residence will lose their right to reside in the Netherlands after a year. It is in the interests of developing countries to make these rules more flexible.<sup>112</sup>

##### *Example*

Migrants from indigenous regions in Mexico, such as Oaxaca, move to California and other US states to find work, yet remain closely involved in the development of their country of origin. Many even own land and property there, and fulfil the obligations to which this gives rise. Failure to meet these obligations can result in the loss of their ownership rights. These migrants maintain their transnational identity – nicknamed 'Oaxacalifornian' – through communication, remittances and return trips. Flexible migration clearly plays an important role here, and has resulted in dynamic Oaxacan communities in both countries.<sup>113</sup>

The Netherlands focuses its development cooperation efforts on a group of specific countries to which it provides budget support, project aid and technical assistance. It may also be useful to help these countries develop their diaspora communities. Encouraging students and business representatives to come to the Netherlands would only be a minor part of such a policy. More meaningful (from the Netherlands' point of view) would be to attract young, promising migrants through the guarantee of a job. An ongoing stream of new migrants would also help these communities to maintain close

111 Stalker, *De feiten over internationale migratie*, Rotterdam 2003; Dr A. Omer, International Conference on Return Migration and Development, Rotterdam, 23 November 2004, account of the UNDP's TOKTEN programme. Netherlands Migration Institute, <[www.nmigratie.nl](http://www.nmigratie.nl)>.

112 See also H. de Haas, *Migratie en ontwikkeling; mythen, nuances en nieuwe inzichten*, in *Internationale Spectator*, May 2004, LVIII, no. 5, p. 256.

113 G. Rivera-Salgado, *Equal in dignity and rights: the struggle of indigenous peoples of the Americas in an age of migration*, inaugural lecture, University of Utrecht, April 2005, p. 17.

links with their countries of origin. The tables in chapter II have already shown that labour migrants account for only a small percentage of the total number of immigrants.

The AIV does not underestimate the risk of social friction in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, it recommends pursuing these efforts to promote development and seeing whether migration policy can contribute to them. As Veenkamp concludes in his study, if we can encourage more effective integration and peaceful coexistence, then we will also succeed in integrating a larger number of migrants into our society without growing friction, thereby increasing absorption capacity.<sup>114</sup> What is more, the immigrants admitted from our partner countries would not be those who are associated with social friction: namely, low-skilled individuals with minimal employment opportunities. This ties in with the argument presented in chapter I, which is that the Netherlands and other European countries must accept that they have had an immigration surplus for many years, or that the percentage of migrants has been rising more recently due to a net emigration surplus of the native population.<sup>115</sup>

In addition to reviewing the Netherlands' immigration policy, another option is to support migration policy in the countries of origin. National governments could be given support in structuring their relationships with emigrants in the diaspora and turning this to their advantage. This requires efficient databases to locate candidates for jobs or assignments in the country of origin (while of course respecting their privacy). National authorities would then maintain contact with emigrants and use these contacts to benefit their fellow citizens.

#### **IV.6 Conclusions and recommendations**

- The Netherlands should encourage limited labour migration from its partner countries, partly to encourage an efficient diaspora.
- The Netherlands should provide technical assistance to countries wishing to engage in their diaspora.
- The EU should launch an extensive programme of jobs and assignments for service providers from developing countries under GATS mode 4.
- The definition of a 'specialist' under GATS should be broadened to improve the prospects for development cooperation.
- To maximise contacts and exchanges with the diaspora, migrants should be allowed to provisionally go back to living in their country of origin. Dutch policy should build in more opportunities for 'flexible migration' ('flexible residence') in the interests of developing countries.
- Pursuing a development policy which is consistent with migration policy also works in reverse: an effective integration policy can increase the absorption capacity of a country like the Netherlands, thereby assisting migration for development.
- Outsourcing/offshoring offers many benefits to developing countries, provided the companies concerned can be persuaded to uphold international health and safety standards for workers in developing countries.

<sup>114</sup> T. Veenkamp et al, *People flow*, in DEMOS, 2003, p. 12.

<sup>115</sup> S. ter Bekke, H. van Dale and K. Henkens, *Emigratie van Nederlanders*, in DEMOS, vol. 21, April 2005.

## **V Migration, migrants and development cooperation: the importance of remittances**

The role of migrants in the development of their country of origin can take many forms. The most direct is to send home money. These remittances are private capital, and how they are spent is not in principle a concern of government policy. Even so, the policy of the country of origin, the host country and international organisations can influence what happens to this capital, thereby increasing its development impact.

### **V.1 Remittances in general**

Based on the definition used by the IMF, remittances are money transfers sent by migrants and the diaspora community to developing countries.<sup>116</sup> In 2001, money transfers of this kind were estimated at USD 71 billion, 50% more than total global development aid.<sup>117</sup> In 2003, official remittances to developing countries came to approximately USD 93 billion. This does not include informal remittances, which are thought to total roughly the same amount again.<sup>118</sup>

Remittances are not development aid as such. However, as part of the overall flow of capital they do have an impact on the development of the recipient country. They are certainly an important factor in macroeconomic terms. Since remittances are usually sent as hard currency but spent in local currency, the recipient country is able to build up currency reserves without increasing its foreign debt. Remittances have this advantage in common with an even larger flow of investments from abroad: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Depending on the policy and level of independence of the central bank, this can improve the balance of payments, which benefits financing for development. Remittances can account for a substantial proportion of national income: 38% in Lesotho, 20% in Jordan, 17% in Cape Verde, 8.9% in the Philippines and 4.1% in Bangladesh.<sup>119</sup>

Remittances can be spent in a number of different ways. De Bruyn and Wets have identified three types of spending: (1) social (consumer spending, repayment of debts, private education and health care), (2) economic (investments in capital-generating

116 IMF in Berlage 2003.

117 H. de Haas, *Migratie en ontwikkeling, mythen, nuances en nieuwe inzichten*, Internationale Spectator, May 2004-LVIII, no. 5; figures taken from P. Gammeltoft, Centre for Development Research, Copenhagen, 2002. For older figures, see also P. Hirst and G. Thompson, *Globalisation in question*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996.

118 *Remittances to developing countries*, in Global Development Finance 2004, World Bank, Washington, 2004, Annexe A.

119 P. Stalker, *Feiten over internationale migratie*, Rotterdam, 2003, p. 111. IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2005, p. 72.

activities) and (3) infrastructural (road networks, etc., financed by collective remittances).<sup>120</sup>

Studies on specific spending patterns do not point to an overall trend in the division between social and economic (and infrastructural) spending.<sup>121</sup> Nor is this particularly significant, since all forms of spending can contribute to poverty reduction, even if it is simply by increasing standards of living and the macro effects on the local economy.<sup>122</sup> Remittances certainly make it possible for large numbers of people to survive in their own countries, thereby reducing their need to go abroad in search of a better income.

De Bruyn and Wets' study summarises their findings on the positive and negative impact of remittances, based on case studies. The positive effects of remittances include macroeconomic factors such as their contribution to the balance-of-payments current account, a better standard of living, the local economy and savings and investments.

The negative effects of remittances include pressure on migrants who send home remittances, and, for the recipients, the risk of dependence, uncertainty and the growth of a migrant culture which expects all good things to come from abroad. Under such conditions, a guaranteed flow of income leads to stagnation rather than greater investment.<sup>123</sup>

*Example*

Fishermen on Lake Malawi ask relatives living in richer countries to send them outboard motors. They are not required to pay for them, take account of depreciation or maintain them. When they break down they simply ask for a new one. This actually discourages them from adopting a business mentality.

120 T. de Bruyn and J. Wets, *Migrantentransfers als ontwikkelingsinstrument, wat kan de overheid doen?*, Catholic University of Leuven, 2004, p. 8-9.

121 *Ibid*; See also P. Stalker, *De feiten over internationale migratie*, Rotterdam 2003, p. 112.

122 *Ibid*. footnote 120, p. 8 and 11. See also N. Spatafora, *Two current issues facing developing countries*, in World Economic Outlook, April 2005, chapter 2, IMF, Washington, p. 77, footnote 10, which lists many studies confirming the positive effects of remittances for poor families in particular, e.g. in terms of access to education and the ability to set up micro-enterprises. See also R.H. Adams Jr and J. Page, *International migration, remittances and poverty in developing countries*, Policy Research Working Paper 3179, World Bank, Washington, 2003 (to be updated in 2005), p. 13. Hence a 10% rise in the share of remittances as a proportion of a country's GNP leads to a 1.6% decline in the number of people forced to live on less than USD 1 a day. This may look like a minor effect, but the size of the remittances is in fact greater. The estimated number of emigrants is also too low. Illegal immigrants in particular send money home through unofficial channels. See also H. de Haas, *International migration, remittances and development: myths and fact*, in Global Migration Perspectives No. 30, April 2005, Global Commission on International Migration, Geneva, p. 8.

123 N. Nyberg Sorensen, *The development dimension of migrant transfers*, Danish Institute for International Studies, working paper no. 2004/16, Copenhagen.



Remittances would make a more effective contribution to development if existing obstacles could be removed or reduced. Some of these obstacles are associated with the payment channels used: poor choice of products and suppliers,<sup>124</sup> high transfer costs, delays, lack of access to banking systems and recourse to informal channels (which, since they do not pay money into the current account of a country, do not contribute to macroeconomic growth). Other obstacles are associated with the situation in the host country, such as lack of policy or a consideration of migrants' needs. Finally, there are obstacles associated with conditions in the country of origin, such as the need to prioritise basic survival and the inefficiency of the financial sector, which is reflected in the lack of (a) access to credit, (b) opportunities and frameworks for investment, (c) schemes for small savers and (d) management. A more general obstacle is lack of information for migrants.<sup>125</sup>

## **V.2 Recommended policy measures**

The Minister for Development Cooperation sees few opportunities for government intervention regarding remittances, which are after all private capital transfers.<sup>126</sup> However, the ministry's support for the creation of the Netherlands Financial Sector Development Exchange (NFX), a public-private partnership for the development of the financial sector in developing countries<sup>127</sup>, has now given it a platform for promoting both the macroeconomic and microeconomic development value of remittances.

The AIV feels it would be both appropriate and useful to formulate policy aimed at optimising the impact of remittances on development. There are various tools available for this, including: (1) embedding remittance policy in overall policy, (2) increasing volume by making transfers more attractive, (3) improving channels, (4) influencing the situation in the country of origin and (5) top-up funding.

### *V.2.1 Embedding in overall policy*

It is important to incorporate policy governing remittances sent to developing countries into overall development policy, so that both are pursuing the same goals. Remittance policy should also be embedded in bilateral policy. Because remittance policy is an area in which the Ministry of Finance has the most technical knowledge and relevant networks, coordination with this ministry is essential. Within the context of bilateral policy, since they are part of overall policy, remittances are included in discussions with the recipient country and links can be made with other development efforts. This also provides a framework for dialogue with other donors.

124 Usually the only available option is the transfer of money for cash withdrawals; there are very few savings, investment, insurance or pension schemes. Use of electronic transfer and invoicing systems is limited, as is integration with financial service providers in the host country.

125 Summary based on De Bruyn and Wets.

126 The minister does not, for example, believe that the government should try to reduce transaction costs. Report of the meeting between members of government and the permanent parliamentary committees on foreign affairs and justice, House of Representatives of the States General, 7 December 2004, Parliamentary Papers 29 693, no. 2, p. 8.

127 Covenant published in the Government Gazette of 14 July 2004.

Remittance policy should be addressed continually by the relevant department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the interministerial consultative structure concerned with migration and development. They can then gather knowledge and evaluate experience.

The Minister for Development Cooperation should conduct a survey in conjunction with the financial sector – for example through NFX and FMO – and in consultation with the Minister for Immigration and Integration and the Minister of Finance, to evaluate per country the situation surrounding remittances sent from the Netherlands. Special attention should be given to the obstacles encountered by migrants.<sup>128</sup> The survey should also include an examination of the patterns and motives underlying these financial transfers, the role of financial service providers and whether there is demand for products other than money transfers (such as insurance, pensions, savings accounts or investments). Attention should be paid to the delicate balance between investment in countries of origin and to integration into the host country. This project and any general measures should also be used to benefit migrants who are not from the Netherlands' partner countries. The ministry could establish a monitoring group of financial and economic experts and representatives from the migrant community to oversee the initiative.

Information exchange with other European countries, the United States and international financial institutions is crucial for the success of this project, partly because financial services are increasingly offered transnationally and partly because migrant groups are internationally dispersed.

#### *V.2.2 Increasing the volume of remittances*

The Netherlands' policy should tie in more closely with those of its partner countries, which will be geared to increasing the volume of incoming capital through regulated channels. Only then can recipient governments pursue effective macro and microeconomic policies aimed at optimising the development effects of incoming revenue.

Substantial remittances require dynamic transnational networks with their own specific identities. In the Netherlands, the weakening of links between migrants and their families abroad following an extended stay in the host country often leads to a sharp decline in remittances.<sup>129</sup> The proposed policy should therefore encourage migrants to set up their own organisations and define their own identity. These organisations and identities should then become building blocks in Dutch society. In the literature this integration of clearly defined cultural units is referred to as the 'rainbow' or 'salad bowl' model.

#### *V.2.3 Improving channels for money transfer*

The government must take steps to create the right conditions to meet migrants' needs. That means pursuing an active policy to foster competition and widen the range of products on offer, partly by encouraging alliances between financial institutions in the Netherlands and its partner countries. Since not all the financial institutions which

<sup>128</sup> Compare the summary of remittance practice within the Cape Verdean, Moroccan, Somali and Surinamese migrant communities in the Netherlands, as described in J. van der Meer, *Stille gevers, migranten en hun steun aan het buitenland*, Amsterdam, 2004.

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*

handle remittances are supervised by the Dutch central bank, the government should put forward proposals for supervision and a code of conduct in consultation with these institutions. This would also improve insight into their activities. Migrants must be given more information about the various options available to them, for example through an information and advice centre. Again, the government can play a key role here. The website <[www.sendmoneyhome.org](http://www.sendmoneyhome.org)>, co-financed by the UK's Department for International Development, is a good example.<sup>130</sup> All these initiatives will help to reduce transaction costs.<sup>131</sup>

This is not just a topical issue in the Netherlands. Other countries are holding similar policy talks with the formal and informal financial sectors at EU and international level and initiatives have been developed by multilateral organisations. These include a World Bank project involving consultations in the context of a partnership with the financial sector.

The risk of these channels being misused should be explored in advance, as should potential infringements of measures to achieve greater deregulation.

#### *V.2.4 Influencing the situation in the country of origin*

The biggest obstacle to mobilising the large volume of remittances and converting them into savings is the frequently poor quality of the financial sector in the country of origin. This includes not just the limited availability of banking services outside capital cities and for the poorer sections of the population, but also lack of supervision and control by the government. The AIV therefore endorses the emphasis which the Netherlands and other donors have placed in recent years on the need to boost the financial sector as part of private sector development. Efficient local governments, a sound economic foundation and a basic infrastructure are also needed.<sup>132</sup>

Enabling conditions must be complemented by a targeted approach. The Dutch government can encourage the use of remittances for economic ends in consultation with the country of origin. For example, countries of origin can use tax incentives to try to channel incoming revenue in the right direction. Some countries are already doing this by offering specific accounts for emigrants. The 'non-residents' accounts', which played a major role in financing the modernisation of the industrial base in India, is a well-known example.

#### *V.2.5 Top-up funding*

In some cases, project-based deployment of remittances can be encouraged by a willingness on the part of the government in the country of origin to top up the transferred amounts. In the United States, for example, money is collected by the Mexican Home Town Associations (HTA) under targeted programmes in which the Mexican authorities agree to double what is saved. This has produced significant results. The Netherlands

130 A similar approach is also recommended in the IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2005, p. 84.

131 For example, the transaction costs charged by Western Union for the transfer of USD 200 apparently fell from USD 22 to USD 10 between 1999 and 2003, due to increased competition. Inter-American Dialogue 2004, <[www.iadalog.org](http://www.iadalog.org)>.

132 N. Nyberg Sorensen, *The development dimension of migrant transfers*, Danish Institute for International Studies, working paper no. 2004/16, Copenhagen.

could bring this approach to the attention of other countries of origin and, if necessary, help them to set up similar schemes.

### **V.3 The overall role of migrants in development**

There are various ways in which migrants can contribute to development in their country of origin: through remittances, the transfer of knowledge, commercial enterprise, private local initiatives and policy input.

With regard to the role of migrants in development policy, the AIV notes that contacts between the ministry – and the cofinancing organisations – and migrants and migrant organisations are still quite sporadic. The government memorandum does, however, provide opportunities for such contact.<sup>133</sup> Migrant organisations and migrant groups can play a role as points of contact, sources of information, pools of experts, catalysts and, where necessary, clearing houses for initiatives. They can also act as a forum or sounding board for the planning and implementation of development and migration policy, and for formulating the interaction between these two areas.

In this context, the AIV wishes to draw attention to the work of the Belgian Senate, which has made a number of policy recommendations concerning the role that migrants can play in furthering the development policies of Belgium and the European Union.<sup>134</sup> The AIV would like to see some of these recommendations applied to the situation in the Netherlands, as follows:

- It pays to involve migrants, both socially and professionally, in sustainable development projects carried out in developing countries in the framework of a partnership. Particular attention should be given to newcomers and to the expertise they may be able to contribute. These individuals can then maintain their links with their country of origin, and the Netherlands can help them to apply their skills and encourage positive integration in their new homeland.
- When refugees are being offered education and training, they must be given the option of working either in the host country, their region of origin or another developing country. In this way, the integration programme can also benefit development projects.
- It is important to see migrants as potential contributors to the development process. This will also help to combat stereotypical views and preconceptions.
- The understanding of the interaction between development and migration that has been acquired through cooperation between the Minister for Development Cooperation and the Minister for Immigration and Integration and other ministers must be retained. This means focusing not only on the points of contact between development policy and migration policy, but also on the themes targeted by development cooperation. A temporary, formalised network of relevant civil servants is also a possibility.

<sup>133</sup> Government memorandum, The Hague, 9 July 2004, Parliamentary Papers 29 693, no. 1, p. 38.

<sup>134</sup> See *Migranten en ontwikkeling: krachten voor de toekomst*; a report compiled on behalf of the Belgian Senate's Foreign Relations and Defence Committee, 2003-2004 session, 22 June 2004, 3-351/1.

- Information and advice must be provided in an integrated way across the entire development spectrum, to support development projects launched by individual migrants, groups of migrants and migrant organisations. This need not be provided by a separate information centre. The objectives should be:
  - to encourage migrants and migrant organisations to integrate their projects into local development policy;
  - to provide direct assistance to small-scale projects;
  - to strengthen the experience of migrant organisations;
  - to focus special attention on gender aspects in projects in the countries of origin;
  - to encourage better use of remittances by migrants. Migrants need access to information and best practices concerning the productive use of remittances (such as starting up profitable activities) and the effects of their money transfers on development.

The main thread running through these recommendations is the contribution that can be made by migrant organisations. However, these organisations must first be up and running. Bringing together migrants from many different categories, population groups, convictions and affiliations in each country and from many different countries in a single region is extremely complex and time-consuming. Sometimes tangible results are achieved only after many years and following many attempts. The AIV believes that the government has a role to play here, not so much in taking over this work but in providing support and in boosting the vitality of these organisations through a targeted approach.

Support need not be confined to migrant organisations; in some cases, practical help to individuals may be more effective. Another possibility is to offer assistance in setting up projects through a helpdesk, to ensure that remittances are made in a suitable way. Technical assistance can include help in setting up projects, dealing with paperwork and locating a reliable partner organisation in the country of origin.<sup>135</sup> The cofinancing organisations are already taking steps to make themselves more accessible. However, there still appears to be much to be done to increase the availability of (a) advice and assistance in the local language, (b) expertise in implementing projects in migration countries and (c) active recruitment of migrants and their organisations. Subsequent evaluations, e.g. of the initial phase of the Linkis programme,<sup>136</sup> could be used to evaluate the impact of these efforts on levels of migrant participation and to gauge how successfully the aforementioned objectives are being realised.

### *Linkages*

Contacts between institutions in the diaspora countries and those in countries or regions of origin can be fruitful for development. The exchange of knowledge and experience between universities, hospitals, home town associations and NGOs can provide a framework in which migrants can contribute to development in their country of origin.

<sup>135</sup> See the work of the Consultation Centre for the Integration of Refugees (OCIV), a Belgian organisation described in De Bruyn and Wets, pp. 53 *et seq* and 67.

<sup>136</sup> Linkis is a partnership which brings together cofinancing organisations, theme-based cofinancing organisations, the National Committee for International Cooperation and Sustainable Development (NCDO) and COS Nederland (a nationwide association of centres for international cooperation) for small privately-run projects in developing countries; see <[www.linkis.nl](http://www.linkis.nl)>.

Formalised town twinnings are a good example. According to a recent evaluation, the impact of such initiatives can be considerable.<sup>137</sup> They also enable migrants to remain abreast of developments at home, which in turn encourages a dynamic diaspora and can boost local development in the form of temporary or permanent return.

#### **V.4 Return to assist development**

Migrants can also return to their country or region of origin of their own accord, to work on behalf of development. These countries often have great need of their skills. Here security and economic considerations are very important. Those who decide to return to a country that is recovering from a civil war or a repressive regime tend to have different motives and needs to those who are contemplating returning to a country that is now offering them better economic prospects.

One dilemma following return is that the government of the host country often puts forward candidates for training and supervision whose only common characteristic is that their application for a residence permit has been turned down. Specialist organisations prefer to work with candidates who are sufficiently self-motivated and, for example, have the capacity to set up their own businesses once they have returned home. It is an advantage if there is no pressure of time to return to the country of origin. In general, there should be more emphasis on development and less on return.

A joint report by four NGOs from the Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Sweden has identified a number of success factors based on experience in various post-conflict countries.<sup>138</sup> These relate to the establishment of small businesses, the supply of labour and construction projects. Small businesses require experienced entrepreneurs, a business plan based on the market situation and access to local consultants during the start-up period. The supply of labour means that there is up-to-date information about labour needs in the country concerned, a central employment service and job creation. Construction projects primarily need a master plan which takes account of the needs and concerns of local residents.

The study also drew one or two general conclusions. To begin with, migrants should be seen as a potential resource rather than as a problem. Their decision to return should not be prompted by the prospect of financial support. The community in which the remigrants are to settle following their return should be included in the discussions. Responsibility for monitoring can be shared by European NGOs. Supervision will in all cases be both labour-intensive and flexible; this will keep down the numbers of migrants. The return of some remigrants can generate employment for others. Voluntary return creates the best opportunities for success.

<sup>137</sup> AGEF, Caritas Wien, the Göteborg Initiative and the Netherlands Migration Institute, *Returning migrants: triggers for reconstruction and assets for development?*, chapter 8, to be published in 2005.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*

The AIV regards these conclusions, which tie in with the findings of a conference on the same subject, as logical.<sup>139</sup> The report does however point out that the conclusions it has reached on development (except for those relating to construction) are difficult to demonstrate by means of indicators, and therefore recommends a more comprehensive and extended evaluation of the projects. The AIV also feels that creating the right conditions to promote sustainable development will have a greater effect than supporting individuals. It would also be better to operate on a larger scale, which suggests that an approach at EU level would be best.

The AIV wishes to point out that return need not be a goal in itself. Development can be very effectively promoted by enabling migrants to return home under temporary contracts. They would then enter a process of circular migration, where they could also make a substantial contribution as part of a transnational network. What is more, migrants will be more likely to want to explore their opportunities in their country of origin if they are not confronted with the stark choice of whether to return home permanently or remain in the host country.

The AIV recommends that the government address the following aspects:

- Return projects should be facilitated through an enabling policy based on cooperation between ministries. Supervision and training in the Netherlands, advice and assistance in the developing country, and the financial and legal residence aspects of return should all be coordinated. Assistance and advice in the developing country should be provided by a series of support centres which are not part of a diplomatic mission.
- When developing specific projects, more use could be made of existing expertise in other Western countries. NGOs and other organisations which implement such projects are known to maintain contact with each other. However, it is also crucial to encourage projects to be implemented jointly. Obstacles to financing should be removed so that organisations can make available their geographic and other expertise to their counterparts in other Western countries. This applies especially to networks of consultants in countries of origin and return.
- The emphasis within projects must lie on individual assistance. This approach is by definition highly labour-intensive.
- Support should be given to associations of alumni of Dutch educational institutions working in developing countries, e.g. in the form of a part-time local contact point outside the Dutch embassy. Nuffic, the Netherlands Organisation for International Cooperation in Higher Education, could play a role here.
- In general, steps should be taken to ensure that migrants, as well as local manpower, are brought in to help implement development projects.

139 Website [www.nmigratie.nl](http://www.nmigratie.nl) and report of a visit to Iraqi Kurdistan <[www.initiativet.nu/rmd\\_rapport.pdf](http://www.initiativet.nu/rmd_rapport.pdf)>.

## VI Summary

The Dutch government is working towards a coherent policy. Coherence is not a given, but a goal that is difficult to realise. One major stumbling block is that different parties approach this task from different perspectives. Discussions on how to achieve an integrated policy therefore focus on the individual missions of each policy area. This also applies to development and migration policy. Development policy aims at sustainable poverty reduction by tackling the causes of poverty. The aim of migration policy is to control migration, partly by removing the causes of unregulated migration. This is also founded on a global responsibility to address economic and security-related needs and threats.

The AIV believes that measures to promote coherence between development cooperation and migration policy cannot be achieved by subordinating one policy area to the other. Where the two policy areas meet, one may be able to support the other. To this extent, any steps to directly regulate (i.e. restrict) migration to the Netherlands will affect only a few thousand migrants per year. That is a small proportion of the overall number of immigrants. The AIV therefore concludes that it is not always possible to reconcile all the various interests at stake.

The main causes of migration can be classified under two dimensions: the security dimension (conflicts and human rights violations) and the economic dimension (internal/domestic and external/international causes of poverty).

Development cooperation efforts to bring about an integrated security policy can certainly help indirectly to bring the goals of migration policy closer. Asylum applications broadly reflect global patterns of insecurity. This lack of security must be addressed, not so much to limit migration as to improve the lives of local people. Experience has shown that (a) improved security tends to lead to a reduction in forced and voluntary migration and (b) a substantial improvement in the security situation in a country is often followed by high levels of return migration by those who initially left for security reasons. Efforts should therefore concentrate on preventing, alleviating and reversing deterioration of the security situation in a country. The Netherlands must be prepared to intervene politically, militarily and financially at an early stage to contribute to an effective integrated security policy. To some extent, this is also a form of development cooperation policy. International coordination will ensure that an integrated security policy eventually extends to all insecure regions.

There are certain parallels here with human rights policy, in that preventing or ending human rights violations will also remove one of the causes of migration.

The possible effects of development policy on the economic causes of migration are less clear. Few of the instruments used in bilateral development cooperation policy will have a direct impact on the causes of migration. Development is a long-term activity. It is therefore difficult to determine whether it has any short-term effects on limiting migration. In the short term, development often leads to an increase in migration. It is therefore better for development cooperation to focus on its primary goals of poverty



reduction and creating economic opportunities. The more successful these efforts are, the less pressing will be the urge to migrate in the long-term and the more attractive it will be for migrants to return to their country of origin.

In addition, the countries of origin of asylum-seekers and other immigrants are generally not development cooperation partners of the Netherlands, though one or two of the countries that produce the greatest numbers of asylum-seekers are on the list of partner countries. The government could therefore adapt the list to include more of these countries. The AIV is, however, not in favour of this option since it does not tie in with the principle of solidarity with the world's poorest. Nor is it feasible, since it is highly doubtful that a concentration of funding on certain countries (e.g. China, Iraq, Somalia) would have the effect of controlling migration to the Netherlands (i.e. asylum migration and family-related migration), even in the long term. This is best achieved at EU level. The EU can invest far more political and financial capital in its relationship with countries of origin and transit. It also has instruments, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy, which specifically target countries from which many migrants come (Turkey, Morocco, the CIS). The EU itself should similarly ensure that policy which is designed purely to limit migration does not compromise its own development cooperation spending. Another argument for tackling the problem at EU level is that unilateral attempts by individual member states to limit migration will not work. There is little point in individual member states trying to divert immigration flows towards neighbouring countries. Such efforts will have no net result at this level. In time, immigrants will in any case be able to move to another EU member state if they wish, under the principle of the free movement of persons.

The AIV does not agree with the proposal to suspend Dutch or EU development aid to countries of origin which fail to take back their own nationals. It feels that the main aim of development aid is to help developing countries. Threatening to withhold assistance benefits them in no way at all. The AIV does, however, support the use of donor aid to promote good governance, capacity building and the migration policies of countries of origin. This will, it feels, also ultimately foster a more fluid international movement of people.

After discussing how development cooperation can benefit migration policy, this report considers how migration policy can help to promote development. It concludes that a restrictive migration policy holds back development.

If developing countries and migrants use migration as a strategy for development, the Dutch government must examine whether it too, can adopt this strategy.

The GATS talks must create more scope for employers to acquire short-term services from developing countries.

The governments of partner countries should create extra opportunities to enable their citizens to be recruited for work in the Netherlands, in line with the strategy of using migration to foster development.

To preserve vital transnational migrant communities and exchanges in trade, education and culture, the government must look at what migrants need in order to travel (for

example, whether they require temporary residence permits). This can also serve the Netherlands' interests, given that long-term shortages are likely to occur in specific sectors of the labour market. It is up to the Centres for Work and Income (CWI) and the sectors themselves to identify these shortages. Some of the demand – which is currently being evaluated by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment – can be met by looking to the Netherlands' partner countries and other developing countries.

Outsourcing is another way of recruiting manpower from elsewhere, in addition to labour migration and trade. Outsourcing to locations with low production costs generally benefits both the Netherlands and developing countries. Extra support should therefore be given to the Emerging Markets Cooperation Programme (PSOM), activities conducted by the Centre for the Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries (CBI), and other schemes to help developing countries create economic opportunities for themselves.

Migrants' contribution to the development of their country of origin is a positive asset which deserves to be given support. The input that migrants and their organisations bring to foreign and development policy and to the theme of 'development and migration' benefits those involved, the country of origin and the Netherlands itself. Migrants are a reservoir of information, expertise and potential manpower. Occasionally, they also wield political influence in their country of origin which could be of use to the Netherlands. The conditions for an effective dialogue with migrants can be improved. Migrants' organisations should be given more help in establishing consultative structures, and migrants themselves could be given specific support to set up and realise small development projects in their region of origin. The impact of existing initiatives to involve migrants in development policy should be evaluated.

Although migrants are free to decide what happens to the money they send home, this does not rule out measures to enhance the development effects of these remittances. Various financial services can be offered to migrants to persuade them to invest in the interests of development. National and international initiatives should concentrate on increasing the volume of official remittances, improving the channels through which they are paid, improving local investment opportunities and supervising projects. At national level, an interministerial approach to perceived general obstacles, plus a system to provide specific support, would be useful.

Many initiatives have already been devised to return migrants to their country or region of origin. One complicating factor is that returning asylum-seekers whose applications were rejected are not in the same starting position as migrants who have made a positive decision to build an economic future in their country of origin. One of the AIV's conclusions is that return can be encouraged if returning migrants are given a safety net in the form of possible readmission to the Netherlands. Recent studies have failed to show whether return projects have any clear effect on development, apart from activities in the construction industry. More extensive study is therefore required. Such labour-intensive projects do nevertheless appear to offer potential benefits to those involved.

The Dutch government is committed to working towards coherent migration and development cooperation policies. To achieve this, it is important to mobilise sufficient

knowledge on the development aspects of migration. This should include knowledge about migration, the interests of developing countries, migrants and Western countries, and about policy developments in the Netherlands and elsewhere. Much of this knowledge was brought together for the government memorandum on migration and its follow-on activities. A way must now be found to retain this knowledge and combine it with expertise gained from projects. While the AIV does not prescribe a specific structure, it nevertheless wishes to highlight the importance of maintaining and deepening this knowledge. The knowledge that has been gained by the relevant ministries should also be kept up to date.

The AIV feels that policy would benefit through the availability of more accurate information in a number of areas. The following topics require further investigation:

- illegal immigrants (numbers, background and motives for entering the Netherlands);
- the economic contribution made by migrants, based on more recent figures than those gathered by the CPB in 2003;
- the need for labour in specific sectors in the longer term due to the progressive ageing of the Dutch population (the evaluation currently being conducted by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment will throw more light on this);
- further study by the EU on the development effect of return projects.

F. Korthals Altes  
Chairman of the Advisory Council on International Affairs

The Hague  
3 November 2003

Dear Frits,

A request for advice on 'Asylum and migration in relation to development cooperation' was included, partly at my request, in the AIV work programme for 2003. The work programme states that work on this advisory report could run on into 2004. I am sending you some additional information on the points that I would like you to examine in the report.

*Background*

In recent years, the House of Representatives and the government have placed the relationships between asylum, migration and development cooperation firmly on the agenda. Members of Parliament have asked questions about numerous possible links (the role of development cooperation in repatriation policy, in combating illegal migration and the brain drain, in labour migration) and have called for the integration of policy on migration and foreign policy. The AIV, on its own initiative, is preparing an advisory report on European asylum and migration policy. This needs to be complemented by a report that deals specifically with the relationship between development cooperation and migration.

In view of the wide-ranging nature of the policy fields concerned, it is important to limit the scope of the report. Migration has many facets: South-North migration, South-South migration, asylum migration, labour migration, migration in the context of family reunification or formation, illegal migration, abuse of asylum procedures, etc. Development cooperation also has many different dimensions. For instance, there is an important distinction between structural development aid aimed at poverty reduction and sustainable development and the more humanitarian-oriented emergency and reconstruction aid.

The report should focus mainly on South-North migration, and more particularly on countries with which the Netherlands has a development cooperation relationship.

Migration for the purpose of family reunification or formation will not be dealt with. Although this is the largest form of legal migration to the Netherlands at present and precisely the kind of migration where problems with integration arise, the link with development cooperation is weak. This type of migration is, in any case, strongly influenced by Dutch domestic policy. Moreover, the majority of migrants in this category come from middle-income countries that do not belong in the category of developing countries or priority countries for Dutch development policy.

The request for advice will focus on two areas:

- the potential contribution of migrants in the Netherlands and other European countries to development in their countries of origin, and the possible role of development cooperation in this;
- the need for coherence between development cooperation policy and Dutch and European asylum and migration policy.

#### *Contribution of migrants to development in their countries of origin*

In recent years, awareness has grown that migration from developing countries is a permanent phenomenon with serious consequences for development in those countries. In general, the net effects of migration on development in the countries of origin appear to be positive, particularly in view of the remittances from migrants to their families in these countries. Yet there are also negative effects, such as the emigration of highly skilled workers (brain drain). Yet many migrants remain part of an international network of compatriots in their country of origin and in their country of residence.

Against this background, many countries within the donor community have developed and tested ideas for supporting the contribution of migrants in the 'diaspora' to development in their countries of origin. Examples include the French model of co-development and the Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) programme of the International Organisation for Migration. The Netherlands supports a MIDA pilot project in Ghana.

I would like the advisory report to analyse the experiences of the Netherlands and other European countries and international organisations in this field, in order to identify lessons learned and best practice.

#### *Coherence between development cooperation policy and Dutch and European migration policy*

The discovery that migration generally has a positive effect on developing countries has given rise to a conflict between the objectives of development cooperation policy and those of migration policy, which focuses on controlling migration to the Netherlands and Europe. It is therefore important for the government to pursue a coherent policy in these fields.

I would like to gain more insight into ways of achieving more coherence in the following three policy sectors, based on the experiences of other countries:

- conflict policy;
- repatriation;
- labour migration.

*Conflict policy* is one of the focus areas for development cooperation in the next few years. Besides being important from the point of view of Dutch foreign policy, conflict policy could also help control migration to the Netherlands and Europe. Asylum migration appears to be closely linked to international conflicts, since the vast majority of asylum seekers in the Netherlands in recent years have come from countries torn by civil war and other conflicts. The successful prevention, management and resolution of conflicts leads at any rate to a decrease in primary refugee flows (mainly South-South) and is ultimately expected to reduce secondary migration (including South-North). The key question is whether increasing the protection and integration of war refugees and displaced persons in conflict regions will lead to a decrease in secondary South-North migration. In this connection, UNHCR has developed the Convention Plus concept. The topic is also being debated in Europe on the initiative of the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair. In late May 2003 the government sent the House of Representatives a preliminary memorandum on the subject of 'protection in the region', which will be followed by a second memorandum in September 2003.

To develop this policy concept further, it would be useful to consider the following questions:

- How can development cooperation make the most effective contribution to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and to post-conflict reconstruction? Is enhanced structural and preventive cooperation with countries at risk effective? Would a structural shift from humanitarian aid to reconstruction aid and poverty reduction in a post-conflict scenario help to maintain peace settlements? In this context, UNHCR has developed the concept of the 4Rs: repatriation, rehabilitation, reintegration, and reconstruction.
- To what extent would a conflict-based foreign and development cooperation policy contribute to a reduction in primary and secondary refugee and migration flows? To what extent does strengthening protection in the region help reduce secondary migration? Can a conflict-based foreign and development cooperation policy for a region create a synergy with a policy to strengthen protection in that region? Can a policy based on 'protection in the region' succeed when linked with a conflict-based policy?

*Repatriation* of illegal aliens and failed asylum seekers is central to Dutch aliens policy. In practice, however, it is difficult to carry out repatriation policy (see the letter to the House of Representatives of 1 February 2002). Nevertheless, repatriation policy has become more effective, partly because forced repatriation is being used more frequently in cases where aliens do not return voluntarily.

The EU has also taken steps to promote repatriation by concluding readmission agreements with countries outside the EU. The cooperation of the countries of origin is essential for carrying out repatriation policy. Many western countries have considered using the suspension of development aid to countries of origin as a lever for obtaining this cooperation. Ways of linking development cooperation to cooperation in the field of readmission have also been explored. In recent years, the Netherlands has released limited development cooperation funds for the repatriation of aliens, through a project for assisted return of rejected asylum seekers from 1996 to 2000, and other, more recent activities (see the letters to the House of Representatives of 1 October 2001 and 1 February 2002). In addition, the government has resolved that countries that do not cooperate on readmission will no longer be eligible for development aid.

In this context, there is a great need for an analysis of the experiences of the Netherlands and other countries with regard to lessons learned and best practice, focusing on the following questions can be used as a guide:

- In which cases (for which countries) is a negative or positive link between development cooperation and readmission most effective?
- In which cases is development cooperation the most appropriate lever, compared with other areas of foreign policy?

*Labour migration* is regarded in many international studies as positive for development in all countries concerned. In the Netherlands, however, there are indications that the effects of labour migration, in the present situation, have largely been negative (CPB: '*Immigration and the Dutch Economy*'). The Netherlands does not have a policy of attracting economic migrants, except for allowing temporary migration for vacancies that are difficult to fill.

The effects of labour migration on developing countries are also unclear. On the one hand, remittances from migrants to their country of origin and the experiences and networks built up by migrants have important positive effects. On the other hand, however, the brain drain that results from migration has a strong negative effect. In spite of this, most developing

countries see labour migration as a way of boosting their economies. Their wish to expand the possibilities for temporary labour migration is explicitly stated on the agenda of the current WTO round on a *General Agreement on Trade and Services*. Labour migration policy is also being developed within the EU.

The question arises as to what extent government policy should focus on expanding the possibilities for temporary and other types of labour migration from developing countries to the Netherlands and the EU. This is another issue that I would request the AIV to examine.

Yours sincerely,

[signed]

Agnes van Ardenne-van der Hoeven  
Minister for Development Cooperation

**List of abbreviations**

<b>ACVZ</b>	Advisory Committee on Alien Affairs
<b>AIV</b>	Advisory Council on International Affairs
<b>CAVV</b>	Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law
<b>CBI</b>	Centre for the Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries
<b>CBS</b>	Statistics Netherlands
<b>CIS</b>	Commonwealth of Independent States
<b>CWI</b>	Centre for Work and Income
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FDI</b>	Foreign Direct Investment
<b>FMO</b>	Netherlands Development Finance Company
<b>GATS</b>	General Agreement on Trade in Services
<b>ILO</b>	International Labour Organisation
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>IND</b>	Immigration and Naturalisation Service
<b>IOM</b>	International Organisation for Migration
<b>IT</b>	Information technology
<b>MDG</b>	Millennium Development Goals
<b>MFO</b>	Cofinancing organisation
<b>NFX</b>	Netherlands Financial Sector Development Exchange
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental organisation
<b>NIDI</b>	Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute
<b>NL</b>	The Netherlands
<b>NLG</b>	Dutch guilders
<b>Nuffic</b>	Netherlands Organisation for International Cooperation in Higher Education
<b>ODA</b>	Official Development Assistance
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
<b>PSOM</b>	Emerging Markets Cooperation Programme
<b>ROA</b>	Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>US</b>	United States
<b>VNO/NCW</b>	Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers



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